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ANNOUNCING REMEDIES
Samuel L. Brayf
It is a familiar ideal that the remedy should fit the wrong-this wrong,
by this wrongdoer, against this victim. Modern legal systems ordinarily pur-
sue this kind offit, at least in civil cases, by tailoring the remedy case by case.
There is an alternative, though, which is for a legal system to announce in
advance exactly what the remedy will be for all violations of a legal rule.
This Article analyzes that alternative and offers a theory for when remedies
should be announced.
Announcing has important social benefits. First, announcing leads to
greater equality because what a successful litigant recovers is not affected by
her race, gender, or other characteristics. Second, announcing produces
greater compliance with legal rules because it assures the public that remedies
are not being unfairly manipulated. Third, announcing reduces the "costs
of telling." When remedies are decided case by case, a plaintiffs recovery
depends on how successfully she tells her story. This telling has personal
costs that are avoided when remedies are announced.
In achieving these benefits, announcing does not operate as a unitary
phenomenon. Sometimes it performs a cost-saving function, sometimes a
communication function, and sometimes a precommitment function. Distin-
guishing among these functions is critical to the proper use of announcing.
Other important considerations include the interplay of rights and remedies,
the need for future proofing, and the way announcing one remedy can affect
the entire system of remedies.
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INTRODUCTION
On residential streets in Manhattan, there are signs that say:
DON'T HONK
$350 PENALTY
If someone honks her car horn and is apprehended by an officer,
the "remedy" is the same no matter how much harm was caused. Did
the car horn cause great harm because it distracted Stephen
Sondheim and made him forget forever a clever turn of phrase? Or
did the car horn trouble no one because the residents were all away?
It does not matter: the penalty is $350.
This is the exception rather than the rule in modem legal sys-
tems, at least with respect to civil remedies. For most violations of
legal rules, we tend to think that the remedy should fit the violation.
And that means that the remedy is determined case by case, usually
after a violation occurs. This approach to remedies is ubiquitous in
tort, contract, property, and constitutional law, as well as many other
substantive domains. For the most part, it is uncontroversial. When
deciding remedies case by case, legal decision makers can avoid over-
and undercompensating particular victims and can consider the char-
acteristics of particular violators that may be relevant for optimal de-
terrence. Of course this rosy picture is not quite complete. The
tailoring of remedies requires tailors (i.e., a society must pay for
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judges), and it thus increases the cost of adjudication. Generally,
though, modern legal systems tailor.
The alternative is announcing that is, determining and declaring
in advance exactly what the remedy will be for all violations of a legal
rule. This Article analyzes the social benefits and functions of an-
nouncing and develops a theory for when remedies should be
announced.
The idea of announcing remedies is familiar in American legal
scholarship. Some scholars have called for scheduling damages in ar-
eas such as pain-and-suffering awards in order to mitigate certain
kinds of arbitrariness.' Other scholars writing in the literature on the
optimal precision of remedies have explored the inefficiency of very
precise damage awards. In particular, Kathy Spier has shown how an
excessive search for precision can discourage settlement,2 and Louis
Kaplow and Steve Shavell have shown that the costs of obtaining more
precise awards are not internalized by the litigants themselves. 3 And
there is a more doctrinal literature on statutory damages that is often
harshly critical of their imprecision and severity. 4 These literatures
recognize a tradeoff between pursuing accuracy and reducing admin-
istrative costs. That tradeoff is important, yet there is much more to
the normative analysis of announcing.
This Article makes two major contributions. The first is an inves-
tigation of the social benefits of announced remedies. One social
benefit is greater equality since the size of the remedy is not affected
by the race, gender, or other characteristics of the parties. Another
social benefit is increased compliance with the law. For this benefit, it
matters that announcing fosters not only equal treatment but also the
perception of equal treatment. This perception encourages compliance
by those who want to obey legal rules as long as they know that "the
game is not rigged."'5 A third social benefit of announcing is reduced
"costs of telling." When remedies are determined case by case, what a
litigant recovers depends on how she tells her story. But telling a story
I See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain
and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 938 (1989).
2 See Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards, 10 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 84, 86-94 (1994).
3 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 191, 192-93 (1996).
4 See, e.g., Michael E. Chaplin, What's So Fair About the Fair and Accurate Credit Transac-
tions Act, 92 MARo. L. REv. 307 (2008) (critiquing statutory damages under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages
in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439 (2009) (critiquing
statutory damages in copyright law); Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Prob-
lem of Statutoiy Damages and Class Actions, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 103 (2009) (arguing that there can
be a lack of due process when statutory damages are available in class actions).
5 Margaret Levi, A State of Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANCE 77, 90-91 (Valerie
Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998).
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can subtly transform the teller. It can change how she thinks about
herself, thus thwarting her "hedonic adaptation" (i.e., the process by
which most people's happiness rebounds after a negative event).6 As
this Article demonstrates, announcing reduces these costs of telling.
The second major contribution of this Article is a theory for when
remedies should be announced. Announcing is not a unitary phe-
nomenon, for it serves different functions depending on context.
Most obviously, announcing can serve a cost-saving function, because
determining the remedy once is cheaper than determining it over and
over again. Announcing can also perform a communication function,
especially when the audience for a legal rule is unsophisticated. Con-
sider an example that is used throughout this Article: if most bloggers
seriously underestimate the remedies for writing a defamatory post,
the legal system is missing out on the deterrent effect of the remedies
that it actually metes out. Announcing the remedy could cure this
underestimation.
Alternatively, announcing can serve a precommitmentfunction when
the audience is made up of sophisticated repeat players and the rem-
edy is meant to be a high "sanction."'7 In a sanctions situation-that
is, when legal decision makers know the socially optimal behavior but
do not know the external costs of nonoptimal behaviors 8-legal deci-
sion makers can precommit to giving a remedy that is large, even ex-
cessive. Such a high sanction can ensure compliance by sophisticated
actors, especially when "compliance" is essentially a one-time decision.
An example in current law is the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978, 9 which threatens banks with the possibility of high statutory
damages if they illegally disclose customer information to the govern-
ment and thus forces banks to adopt controls for the disclosure of
customer information.' 0
Legal scholars and courts have overlooked the diversity of func-
tions of announcing. Nowhere is this omission more critical than in
the growing literature that calls for more vigorous constitutional re-
view of statutory damage awards." That literature attacks statutory
damages for their excessiveness, but it fails to recognize the precom-
mitment function of announcing. When conditions are right for
6 See Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation,
and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REv. 745, 785-86 (2007) (arguing that the process of obtaining
hedonic damages for disability can thwart hedonic adaptation).
7 This point draws on Bob Cooter's distinction between prices and sanctions. See
Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523 (1984).
8 Id. at 1532-37.
9 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2006).
10 See id. § 3417.
11 See sources cited supra note 4.
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precommitment, the excessiveness of the threatened remedy is not a
defect. It is a feature.
The theory developed here includes important constraints on an-
nouncing, as well as a recognition of the way announcing one remedy
can affect the entire system of remedies. Announcing will not be the
optimal strategy for the remedy for every legal rule or even for most
legal rules. But announcing has an important place in an imperfect
system of remedies. It is well suited to the world of the second best-a
world where knowledge of remedies is costly, trust is fragile, and the
legal process is brutal even to those who prevail. In such a world, a
legal system can better achieve its aims if it judiciously adopts an-
nounced remedies.
Two points about the scope of this Article are necessary at the
outset. First, the term "remedies" is here used in the broad sense of
anything awarded or imposed by a court in civil litigation.1 2 Only civil
remedies are in view because criminal penalties raise unique ques-
tions, in part because of institutional facts such as prosecutorial discre-
tion. 13 Second, a simplifying assumption is needed about the
relationship between rights and remedies. Rights can be seen as
claims to remedies; remedies can be seen as the means of carrying
rights into effect. This interrelationship is useful for thinking about
remedies. 14 Yet it also has the potential to overwhelm the analysis
here. Accordingly, this Article assumes that rights and substantive le-
gal rules are held constant and that what can be varied is the individu-
alization and communication of remedies. At crucial points, however,
the Article sets aside this assumption to analyze how the design of
remedies is intertwined with the definition of rights.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the concept of
announcing. Part II develops the social benefits of announcing. Part
III articulates a normative theory for when remedies should be
announced.
12 See Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REv. LITIG. 161, 165
(2008) (defining "remedies" as what "the court can do foryou if you win" or what it "can do
to you if you lose"). The definition, however, is contestable. See infra note 170.
13 See infra note 171.
14 The standard contemporary reference is Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and
Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) ("[R] ights and remedies are inextrica-
bly intertwined."). For earlier discussions, see MARSILIUS' OF PADUA, DEFENSOR PACIS 189
(Alan Gewirth trans., 1956) (1324); JOHN AUSTIN, 2 LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE
PHILOSOPHY OF POSITwIE LAw 767-68 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885); O.W. Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897).
20121 757
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I
INTRODUCING ANNOUNCING
This Part lays the groundwork for the argument that follows.
Subpart A defines and illustrates announcing. Subpart B acknowl-
edges the rationale for not announcing-namely a loss of precision-
and shows where this rationale runs out.
A. Definitions
In fashioning its law of remedies, a legal system will face tradeoffs.
One is the tradeoff between (1) matching the remedy with the harm
to the plaintiff (or the gain to the defendant), and (2) communicat-
ing to the public in advance of any violation what the remedy will be.
It is impossible for a regime of remedies to fully achieve these two
aims of remedial precision and remedial communication.
If remedies are decided case by case, as is typical in the United
States, the legal system seeks to maximize remedial precision. That is,
it tries to maximize the degree to which the remedy fits the particular
violation. But this pursuit of remedial precision comes at a cost be-
cause legal decision makers are limited in their ability to communi-
cate to the public what the remedy will be for any particular violation.
Announcing favors the other side of the tradeoff. Typically, an-
nouncing has two aspects. First, the announced remedy is determined
ex ante and in the aggregate for an entire class of cases. What is an-
nounced is not merely the principle by which the remedy will be de-
termined, but rather the actual quantum of remedy, such as $350 for
all cases of honking a car horn on a residential street in Manhattan. t 5
Second, the announced remedy is communicated to the public, either
directly (as on the "Don't Honk" signs) or indirectly by structuring
information about the remedy so that it will likely be discovered and
15 Although not developed in this Article, there can also be private ordering in the
spirit of an announced remedy. In contract law, the paradigmatic example is liquidated
damages, which are like an announced remedy that the parties have chosen for themselves.
The analogy can be taken too far, however. Liquidated damages are determined in ad-
vance, but they are also customized to the parties' particular circumstances in a way that
general legislation ordinarily cannot be. This unusual combination of announcing and
customization is critical for the modern justifications for supracompensatory liquidated
damages. E.g., Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENr
L. REv. 33 (2003) (showing that a liquidated-damages clause can encourage efficient two-
sided investment). In tort law, too, there is private ordering in the spirit of announced
remedies. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1485, 1532-34 (2009) (describing the personal-injury schedules used by "settlement
mills"); Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004) (describing devices
for aggregate settlement); cf Mark Koyama, Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution
England: Private Providers of Public Goods?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2012) (describing
the use of reward schedules by private prosecution associations in early nineteenth-century
England).
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understood by potential violators.1 6 Most announced remedies have
both aspects, aggregation and publicity, though for some only one as-
pect or the other really matters.
To be clear, when legal decision makers announce the remedy,
they are not indifferent to the value of remedial precision. They are
still trying to get it "right" in the sense of matching the remedy to the
legal violation, 17 but they suffer from various restrictions. One restric-
tion is that they are determining remedies ex ante. Other restrictions
come from the attempted communication. If the "Don't Honk" signs
in Manhattan contained an elaborate mathematical formula for calcu-
lating the fine, that would presumably increase remedial precision,
but it would certainly fail as remedial communication: legal decision
makers would run up against restrictions such as the amount of infor-
mation that could fit on a sign and the willingness of drivers to do the
math.
The definition of announcing given in this Part is streamlined for
analytical purposes. The choice is not really binary, for there are also
intermediate approaches, such as announcing a range and then de-
ciding remedies case by case within that range.' 8 (That intermediate
approach can be found in some statutory damages19 and is character-
istic of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.20 ) Or a legal system could take
something of a middle path by publicizing the principle or rule of
decision that will be used in determining remedies. 21 Or the tension
between remedial precision and remedial communication could be
mitigated somewhat by the use of specific rather than substitutionary
remedies, 22 by new technologies, or by cultural developments. 23 Nev-
ertheless, legal decision makers will never wholly escape the tradeoff
between remedial precision and remedial communication. 24
16 Cf Claire Grant, Promulgation and the Law, 2 INT'LJ.L. IN CONTEXT 321, 325 (2006)
(defining "publication" of laws as "the activity of taking steps to attract people's attention
to laws"). As is common in the jurisprudence literature on the publication and promulga-
tion of laws, Grant emphasizes substantive rules, not remedies. See id. at 321-30.
17 A partial exception is the precommitment function considered in Part III.A.3.
18 See infra Part III.D.
19 Statutory damages are often used in regulatory contexts, such as consumer protec-
tion, privacy, and environmental safety. Statutory damages can be an intermediate ap-
proach, see infra Part III.D.1, but are instances of announcing when they are (or are in
effect) a single fixed amount, see infra notes 128-40 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
21 One example is expectation damages in contract law. Another example is the set
of principles that courts use to determine the sanction for parties and counsel under Rule
11 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CMIL PROCEDURE. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c).
22 For specific remedies such as replevin or disgorgement, the remedy may be deter-
mined case by case and yet also be fairly predictable in advance.
23 For example, the public might better predict case-by-case remedies if betting on
remedies were to become a national pastime.
24 There are obvious affinities with the tradeoffs between rules and standards, as well
as with similar tradeoffs between law and equity, property rules and liability rules, bright
20121
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Before turning to the primary contributions of this Article-the
social benefits of announcing in Part II and the normative theory in
Part II-it is important to understand the force and limits of the ar-
gument for not announcing remedies.
B. The Rationale for Not Announcing
In the United States, civil remedies are usually determined one
case at a time. Behind this practice stands a powerful and straightfor-
ward idea: when legal decision makers determine remedies case by
case they can match the remedy to the violation more precisely. This
is valuable no matter what goal a legal system might pursue.
Consider the goal of optimal deterrence. A single fixed remedy
for all violations of a legal rule will inevitably overdeter some people
and underdeter others since individuals differ from one another in so
many ways. 25 Choosing to tailor the remedy offers the promise of an
escape from this anti-Goldilocks trap-the trap of the remedy always
(except in a trivial number of cases) being either too large or too
small. And by matching the remedy to the particular violation, legal
decision makers can give potential violators "two reasons to improve
their behavior" because potential violators who do make improve-
ments can reduce the likelihood of being found liable and, if they are
found liable, can reduce the level of remedy. 26
Remedial precision seems just as crucial if a legal system is pursu-
ing the goal of compensatory justice. For legal decision makers to
restore a wronged person to her rightful position, they need to know
what her rightful position was or would have been. This is exactly the
information that legal decision makers can develop and employ when
focusing on a single case.
Similarly, if a legal system seeks distributive justice, legal decision
makers will want to know who the parties are. With this knowledge,
lines and balancing tests, agencies and courts, preventive and remedial adjudication, and
legalism and legal holes. Two of the points of departure in this Article are the concentra-
tion on remedies and the emphasis on communication.
25 See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413
(1992) (wealth); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions and Differences in
Individuals'Likelihood ofAvoiding Detection, 13 Ir'L REv. L. & ECON. 217 (1993) (likelihood
of apprehension); Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L.
REv. 182 (2009) (experience of punishment); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Risk Sharing Through
Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 433-36 (1983) (risk aversion); John T.
Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behav-
ior, 39 AM. J. POL. Sc. 490 (1995) (sense of duty to obey the law).
26 Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives,
97 MICH. L. REv. 2185, 2205 (1999). Optimal-deterrence theory also suggests caveats. On
administrative costs, see Arlen, supra note 25, at 427-28. On institutional capacity, see
Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theoy of Contract Reme-
dies, 83 MICH. L. REv. 341, 384 (1984).
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they can learn about the distributive allocations that currently exist
and can incorporate them into decisions about remedies.
For all three of these aims, the precision of case-by-case decision
making about remedies is instrumental. It allows a legal decision
maker to make finer distinctions among violators who need to be de-
terred, or among injured persons who need to be compensated, or
among existing distributive allocations that need to be taken into ac-
count. To borrow an analogy from Joseph Raz,27 the virtue of this
kind of case-by-case decision making is like the virtue of a sharp knife.
Whatever "cuts" a legal system wants to make, it can make these cuts
more carefully and less crudely when it particularizes the remedy.28
This instrumental argument is powerful, and it is deeply embedded in
the practices and discourse of law in the United States. Yet it depends
on a crucial premise: that precision is attainable.
This premise is under strain. Scholars working in a number of
substantive areas and using a variety of methodological approaches
have critiqued the inconsistency and indeterminacy of damage
awards. In particular, critics have shown that certain kinds of damages
are radically unpredictable. These include noneconomic damages,
such as those for pain and suffering or hedonic loss,2 9 and perhaps
punitive damages. 30 The same unpredictability bedevils the remedies
for certain kinds of legal claims that are not primarily about financial
loss but are instead about dignity, autonomy, and other immeasurable
27 SeeJOSEPH RAz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
LAw AND MORALITY 210, 225-26 (2d ed. 2009).
28 The advantage of deciding remedies case by case is only relative, however, because
(1) different decision makers will not give the same remedy even in essentially identical
cases, and (2) in tort law, when remedies are decided case by case, the result is a systematic
overcompensation of victims with smaller losses and undercompensation of those with
larger losses. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1218-21 (1992).
29 See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 1; Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and
Suffering: A Method for HelpingJuries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CALIF.
L. REv. 773, 781-83 (1995); Stephan Landsman, Introduction, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 249,
249-52 (2006) (introducing the symposium Who Feels Their Pain? The Challenge of
Noneconomic Damages in Civil Litigation); Frederick S. Levin, Note, Pain and Suffering Guide-
lines: A Cure for Damages Measurement "Anomie," 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 303, 304-11
(1989).
30 See, e.g., Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Per-
form, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004) (finding arbitrariness and unpredictability in jury-deter-
mined punitive damage awards); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with
Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998) (same). But see Theo-
dore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L.
REv. 743 (2002) (finding a similar ratio between compensatory and punitive damages in
determinations by judges and juries). For surveys of the empirical debate, see Daniel E.
Ho, Comment, Reconciling Punitive Damages Evidence, 166 J. INsTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 27 (2010); Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window
on Punitive Damages, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 25, 36-38 & nn.54-57 (2009).
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human goods.3 1 These legal claims include defamation, invasion of
privacy, trespass on real property, wrongful life, wrongful death, sex-
ual harassment, alienation of affections, false imprisonment, mali-
cious prosecution, and unconstitutional searches and seizures.
Moreover, many of these legal claims have a public or regulatory di-
mension. To take one example, a defamation suit between A and B
does more than resolve a dispute between two parties, for it also delin-
eates the rules of social engagement and community membership. 32
In sum, for these kinds of damages and legal claims, the harm is real
and can even be extraordinarily severe, but it lacks quantifiability,
countability, a distinct border, a mappable size. It is fuzzy. Indeed, it
may well be that these radically indeterminate harms are becoming
more central in the legal system of the United States as people in-
creasingly devote their attention to and center their lives on exper-
iences that are not priced or are hard to value.33
The critics have convincingly undermined the notion that reme-
dial precision is attainable in all kinds of cases. And in one sense, this
is just the rediscovery of what jurists have known all along. There will
always be indeterminacy in law, especially when a legal system insists
on using money to compensate for losses suffered in a "different cur-
rency. '3 4 Nevertheless, the radical imprecision that pervades large
swathes of remedies is important for normative theory. Where reme-
dial precision is impossible, the rationale for not announcing is
diminished.
31 See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REv.
772, 778-819 (1985); Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on
Recovery for Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 359, 373-77 (2006). For these harms, some-
times a court can offer only "random justice held with things half-known, / with restitution
if things come to that." GEOFFREY HILL, Offertorium: December 2002, in WITHOUT TITLE 22, 22
(2006).
32 See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Consti-
tution, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 691, 711-19 (1986). Or, to take another example, false imprison-
ment can be a denial of the liberty of all citizens-not merely of the victim. See, e.g.,John
C. P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REv.
435, 459-60 (2006) (discussing Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.) 769;
2 Wils. 206, 207, an eighteenth-century English case that upheld a massive award of dam-
ages when the king's agents falsely imprisoned a printer with little or no personal loss
because the act was a tyrannical affront to "the liberty of the kingdom").
33 See generally TYLER COWEN, THE GREAT STAGNATION: How AMERICA ATE ALL THE
Low-HANGING FRUIT OF MODERN HISTORY, GOT SICK, AND WILL (EvENTuALLY) FEEL BETTER
(2011) (describing the rise of industries, technologies, and activities for which reliable
judgments of value are not possible, including many uses of the internet). After all, there
is no reason to think that in any particular legal system there will be constant proportions,
over time, of more determinate and less determinate harms.
34 See Rabin, supra note 31, at 365. See generally WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 20
(2006) ("The worry about how hard it is to come up with equivalences is at the core of
primitive systems of justice, and it is hardly something we have adequately resolved to-
day."); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 193-96 (1996) (noting tort law's
ambition to rectify nonpecuniary harm and its recognition that doing so is impossible).
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Optimal deterrence is harder to achieve when harm is indetermi-
nate.3 5 In trying to approximate optimal deterrence, a court is already
faced with the daunting task of knowing many things about the viola-
tor of a legal rule and the victim.3 6 If a court cannot reliably know
how much harm the violator caused, the task is even more difficult,
and it is more likely that the court will err in setting the remedy.3 7 In
addition, for cases involving fuzzy, indeterminate harms, potential vio-
lators may be systematically underdeterred because these harms are
hard to prove and plaintiffs are entitled to recover only for proven
harms. 38
Nor is compensatory justice largely achievable for these harms,
for the indeterminacy goes to the heart of deciding what amount of
compensation is actually due to the victim. At least distributive justice,
it might seem, can best be achieved when there is not an obvious
quantum of remedy since the indeterminacy gives legal decision mak-
ers more room to maneuver. In practice, though, even this is unlikely.
Empirical scholarship on juror decision making suggests that when
damages are more subjective, there is a greater risk of invidious bias. 39
All else being equal, then, if the harm in question is radically indeter-
minate, deciding the remedy case by case is likely to exacerbate distribu-
tive inequalities. In short, the powerful argument for deciding
remedies one case at a time is diminished if there is no realistic possi-
bility of remedial precision.
35 See Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the
Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 87, 94-96 & n.43
(2006) (developing this point, albeit with qualifications, and concluding that "the optimal
provision of pain-and-suffering damages should combine predictability with optimal mean
or median of awards, to preserve deterrence"); see also Bovbjerg et al., supra note 1, at 925
(arguing that "highly variable, unpredictable" damage awards "undercut the deterrence func-
tion of tort law").
36 See sources cited supra note 25.
37 Errors in setting the remedy matter in strict-liability regimes and in negligence re-
gimes in which courts sometimes err in determining liability. See Craswell, supra note 26, at
2190 (noting that in such regimes "optimal deterrence.., requires that the penalty be set
at exactly the right level, not merely that it be at or above some minimum").
38 See Taliferro v. Augle, 757 F.2d 157, 162 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) ("A plaintiff is
not permitted to throw himself on the generosity of thejury. If he wants damages, he must
prove them.").
39 Cf Bovbjerg et al., supra note 1, at 936-38 (finding greater variation in awards of
noneconomic damages than in awards of economic damages); Joel D. Lieberman, Head
over the Heart or Heart over the Head? Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory and Extralegal Heuristics
in Juror Decision Making, 32J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2526, 2536, 2538-39, 2545-46 (2002)
(classifying "loss of income, loss of companionship, and punitive damages" as "subjective
damages"); AndrewJ. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty
of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1328 (2005) (expressing particular con-
cern about inadmissible evidence when "damages... are inherently difficult to quantify").
20121
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
II
SocIAL BENEFITS OF ANNOUNCING
This Part considers three social benefits of announcing: more
equality (subpart A), more compliance (subpart B), and lower costs of
telling (subpart C).40
A. More Equality
In a particular case the parties are particular people. The judge
or the jury will see parties who may have a racial identity or a gender
identity, and may perceive them as physically attractive or unattrac-
tive. 41 Of course these characteristics are not supposed to matter in
deciding remedies. A pedestrian who is injured by a negligent driver
should not recover less for pain and suffering because of her race or
gender or physical attractiveness. Where such disparities do exist,
however, they are a product of deciding remedies case by case. It is
the choice to tailor that makes the remedy stage a site of retail-level
inequality.4 2
These disparities do exist in the United States. Scholars have ana-
lyzed damage awards and criminal sentences, in both experimental
and nonexperimental settings, and the literature presents a disturbing
picture of how personal identity shapes what a person "gets" from
trial. 43
Although the focus of this Article is on civil remedies,4 4 two of the
most recent and striking studies look at the length of criminal
sentences. In an experimental study, Justin Gunnell and Stephen
Ceci examined the interaction of a defendant's physical attractiveness
with a juror's style of processing information. 4 5 For jurors whose style
of information processing depended more on emotion and personal
experience, the physical attractiveness of defendants had a substantial
40 As an analytical matter, a reduction in administrative costs could be presented as a
social benefit. In this Article, such a reduction is discussed with announcing's functions.
See infra Part III.A. 1.
41 The analysis here focuses on these characteristics. It could be extended to other
forms of identity and to circumstances such as having adroit legal counsel.
42 Other scholars have made this point in favor of damage matrices, see Bovbjerg et
al., supra note 1, at 944 n.167, 947, and in favor of rules, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1688 (1976); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 953, 976 (1995).
43 Given that the experimental and nonexperimental approaches have independent
methodological challenges, it is noteworthy that they both support the effects described in
the text. A similar observation is made in Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror
Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 621,
633 (2005).
44 On the difficulty of announcing in the criminal context, see infra note 171.
45 Justin J. Gunnell & Stephen J. Ceci, When Emotionality Trumps Reason: A Study of
Individual Processing Style and Juror Bias, 28 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 850 (2010).
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effect. These jurors were more likely to convict physically unattractive
defendants, and they sentenced them "to approximately 22 more
months (or 67% longer sentences) in prison than attractive defend-
ants."' 46 Gunnell and Ceci also found that all jurors, regardless of
their information-processing style, were more likely to think that a
physically unattractive person was "the type of person who could com-
mit a crime like this. '" 4
7
In a nonexperimental study, Ed Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote ex-
amined the length of sentences for murder, and they found signifi-
cant race and gender effects. 48 They confirmed the "well-known race-
of-victim effect,"49 finding that "white murderers receive a sentence 4
years shorter if they kill a black person instead of a white person, and
black murderers receive a sentence 1.8 years shorter if they kill a black
person." 50 They also found that "[o]ffenders who kill male victims
receive much shorter sentences." 51 Glaeser and Sacerdote paired this
analysis of murder sentences with investigation of a subset of murders:
vehicular homicide cases. This subset is important because the victims
are essentially random. Thus, the usual optimal-deterrence reasons to
vary sentences based on victim characteristics do not apply because
the driver cannot distinguish between victims. Again, Glaeser and
Sacerdote found "substantial victim effects. '52
In a similar vein, there is an extensive social-science literature
that finds disparities in civil remedies, though most of it is older or
narrower than the Gunnell-Ceci and Glaeser-Sacerdote studies.53 For
instance, a RAND study of civil jury verdicts in Cook County, Illinois,
from 1959 to 1979, found that, " [o]n average, black plaintiffs received
only three-fourths as much compensation as whites who had the same
injury, lost income, and type of legal claim. 54
46 Id. at 865.
47 Id. at 868, 877.
48 Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, Sentencing in Homicide Cases and the Role of
Vengeance, 32J. LEGAL STUD. 363, 364 (2003).
49 Id. at 374.
50 Id. at 375.
51 Id. at 373.
52 Id. at 377. The gender effects were "about as strong as in the case of murders
overall," and the race effects were "quantitatively large" though not statistically significant.
Id. at 376-78.
53 See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U.
PA. L. REv. 463, 464-66 (1998);Jane Goodman et al., Money, Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in
Wrongful Death Damage Awards, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 263, 281-82 (1991); Lieberman, supra
note 39; see also W. Jonathan Cardi, The Search for Racial Justice in Tort Law, in CRITICAL RACE
REALISM: INTERSECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, RACE, AND LAW 115, 120-21 (Gregory S. Parks et
al. eds., 2008) (reviewing literature and noting its limitations).
54 AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN
COOK COUNTYJuRY TRIALS 38-39 (1985).
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These disparities arise from the decision to tailor the remedy.
When legal decision makers are working case by case, they see particu-
lar people. But when remedies are announced, legal decision makers
set aside this information, choosing instead to be ignorant about the
characteristics of both the person who violated the rule and the per-
son who was hurt. They are like the judges in a "blind" orchestra audi-
tion who sit behind screens and do not learn the gender of
auditioning musicians in order to avoid bias.55
Announcing the remedy does not remove discretion, discrimina-
tion, and inequality from other aspects of the legal system. Invidious
discrimination could still be embedded in substantive legal rules or in
the way those rules are paired with announced remedies. 56 Moreover,
"upstream" disparities in enforcement and adjudication can mean
that formally equal announced remedies do not fall equally on all sec-
tors of the population.57 But all of those disparities can exist regard-
less of whether remedies are announced. What announcing does is
prevent an additional layer of retail-level disparities.
The decision to announce is thus a decision about allocative
mechanisms. When remedies are announced, the allocations are pub-
licly knowable and can be determined democratically. 58 For tailored
remedies, these allocative decisions-who gets a little more than the
usual remedy, who gets a little less-are hidden. There is no criterion
for the public to be able to assess, in individual cases, whether some-
one received a fair or biased award. And the allocative decisions in
each case will be subject to ,the biases, conscious and unconscious, of
whoever happens to do the tailoring.
B. More Compliance
The equality advantage of announcing has implications not only
for equity but also for deterrence. When remedies are decided case
by case, it is impossible for legal decision makers to offer an assurance
55 See Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind"
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 Am. ECON. REv. 715, 715-16, 721-22 (2000).
56 A familiar example from criminal law is the crack/powder cocaine sentencing dis-
parity. See generally Briton K. Nelson, Comment, Adding Fuel to the Fire: United States v.
Booker and the Crack Versus Powder Cocaine Sentencing Disparity, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1161
(2006).
57 Compare, again in the criminal context, Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial
Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal
Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 1275, 1329-35 (2004) (describing a "ratchet
effect" from racial profiling that "disproportionately distributes criminal records and crimi-
nal justice contacts").
58 There is a danger when the political process determines these allocations that
there will be higher stakes and greater political salience-and thus more competition by
interest groups. See Avraham, supra note 35, at 103 n.81; Eric A. Posner& Cass R. Sunstein,
Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 537, 541, 586, 595 (2005).
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of equal treatment. Because announcing lets legal decision makers
offer this assurance, it gives the public another reason to comply with
legal rules. The mechanism for this effect is grounded in how people
respond to collective-action problems.
Human beings often find themselves in groups where everyone
would benefit if there was cooperation, yet each person has an incen-
tive to defect. Some of the collective-action problems that scholars
have studied most intensively involve groups with access to a "com-
mon-pool resource," such as the stock of fish in a lake.59 To work
together and overcome the collective-action problem, the members of
the group can set up rules for use of the resource-how many fish
each person can catch in a day, for example-but it is critical that
these rules be paired with some form of monitoring and sanction-
ing.60 The psychology for this is not hard to read: individual users of
the common-pool resource are inclined to cooperate only if they think
that "rules ... and monitoring ... will protect them against being a
sucker."6 ' They want "to assure themselves that others are following
the rules most of the time," so "they can continue their own coopera-
tion without constant fear that others are taking advantage of them."6 2
Although there are differences between the collective-action
problems of small and large groups,63 the human desire not to be
taken advantage of is a constant. Consider taxpayers in an industrial-
ized nation. Some comply with tax rules because of the coercive
threat of legal penalties. But coercion explains only a part of taxpay-
ers' compliance. Margaret Levi argues that taxpayers often engage in
"quasi-voluntary compliance," in the sense of complying voluntarily in
a system where the noncompliant are sanctioned. 64 Many taxpayers
want to comply but fear being taken advantage of. Like a group of
fishers or woodcutters with a scarce resource, taxpayers will cooperate
in a way that advances the interests of the group if and only if each
59 See ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 79-80 (2005).
60 Id. at 227-28, 265-67. A study of 178 forest user groups in twelve countries found
that "regular monitoring by a local group is more important... in enhancing forest condi-
tions" than are other variables, such as the "group's social capital, the group's dependence
o[n] forest resources, and whether the group was formally organized or not." Id. at 266.
On the importance of punishment for cooperation in an experimental setting, see Ernst
Fehr & Simon Gdchter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON.
REV. 980, 980-81 (2000).
61 OSTROM, supra note 59, at 267; see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE AcTION 44 (1990).
62 OSTROM, supra note 59, at 265, 267.
63 A stylized account of these differences is found in Elinor Ostrom, Toward a Behav-
ioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and Reputation, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY. INTERDISCI-
PLINARY LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 19, 55-61 (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker
eds., 2003). For cautions about overstating the differences, see OSTROM, supra note 59, at
251-54.
64 MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE 52 (1988).
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individual is confident that the rules are being enforced against other
people. What is needed, then, is "voluntary co-operation in a coercive
system." 65
This quasi-voluntary cooperation is crucial to solving many kinds
of collective-action problems. 66 It has a horizontal dimension and a
vertical one. Horizontally, a person wants to be sure that she is not
being taken advantage of by other people who are playing the game.
Vertically, a person wants to be confident that the enforcers are fairly
applying the rules. 67 If a person can be assured that the enforcers are
effective and fair (vertically), then she will be less concerned about
being taken advantage of by others (horizontally).68
Where these dimensions of confidence exist, a group can harvest
the fruits of cooperation. But where they are absent, where people
suspect that the rules are not being enforced with equal rigor against
other people and that they are being "had," they will be less likely to
quasi-voluntarily comply. The question, then, is how legal decision
makers can assure the public that "the game is not rigged."69
65 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 198 (2d ed. 1994). As Levi says, "The impor-
tance of deterrence is that it persuades taxpayers that others are being compelled to pay
their share." LEVI, supra note 64, at 54. For an evolutionary model of coordinated punish-
ment that includes contingent cooperators, see Robert Boyd et al., Coordinated Punishment
of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare, 328 SCIENCE 617 (2010).
66 See LEVI, supra note 64; OSTROM, supra note 61, at 94-100; see also KAREN S. COOK ET
AL., COOPERATION WITHOUT TRUST? 161 (2005) (describing how judicial interpretation of
Australian tax rules to the benefit of the wealthy led to scandals that were followed by
"increases in tax evasion by those who felt the tax agencies and laws were discriminatory
and unjust") ;Joseph D. Beams et al., An Experiment Testing the Determinants of Non-Compliance
with Insider Trading Laws, 45J. Bus. ETHICS 309 (2003) (finding that experimental subjects
were more likely to engage in insider trading if they thought that other people would trade
on the same information); cf F.M. CORNFORD, MICROCOSMOGRAPHIA ACADEMICA: BEING A
GUIDE FOR THE YOUNG ACADEMIC POLITICIAN 20 (1908) ("The great majority would sooner
behave honestly than not. The reason why they do not .. .is that they are afraid that
others will not; and the others do not because they are afraid that they will not.").
67 Cf LEVI, supra note 64, at 53 (arguing that compliance with a tax regime will de-
crease with an increased "perception of exploitation"); Nathan S. Chapman, Law Asks for
Trust, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 521, 543 (2011) (noting that "law inherently asks the subject to
trust the ruler"). These two dimensions are sometimes described as "vertical trust" and
"horizontal trust." E.g., John T. Scholz & Mark Lubell, Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the
Heuristic Approach to Collective Action, 42 AM. J. POL. ScI. 398, 399-400 (1998). That descrip-
tion is avoided here because "trust" is a freighted and contested term, and the debates over
its meaning are not directly relevant.
68 Strength on both dimensions is not necessary. Contra LEVI, supra note 64, at 53.
That is, as long as people know that others are following the rules, they will be less con-
cerned that the enforcer is ineffective (a Barney Fife scenario). And as long as people
know that the enforcer is effective, they will be less concerned when they learn that some-
one has not complied with a legal rule (a Sherlock Holmes scenario).
69 Levi, supra note 5. In Ostrom's work on common-pool resources, this concern for
accountability is built into the very definition of the monitoring design principle. OSTROM,
supra note 59, at 259; see also id. at 234 (describing Indian farmers' efforts "to 'monitor' the
monitor").
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A distinction can be made between two ways in which the legal
decision makers (in essence, the "enforcers" discussed above) might
be rigging the game and failing to fairly enforce the rules. First, they
might enforce the rules against some people but not others. Second,
they might enforce the rules and yet show favoritism in deciding the
remedies for various infractions-letting off lightly the people who
are rich or white or famous or politically connected.
The first failure (differential enforcement) is something that le-
gal decision makers can promise to avoid, but the promise is not
worth making because it has zero credibility. There are so many dis-
cretionary points in the process of enforcement (by public or private
actors) that it is ordinarily impossible for legal decision makers to
bind themselves. Contrast this with a promise to avoid the second
failure, a promise to give the same remedy to everyone whether
wealthy and connected or poor and powerless. This promise is verifia-
ble, for the public can see the promise kept every time a remedy is
given. Such a steady drumbeat of remedies supports a sense of equal
treatment.
Announcing thus allows legal decision makers to precommit in a
way that encourages quasi-voluntary compliance. 70  No similar
precommitment to equal treatment is possible when remedies are de-
cided case by case. This is not to say that case-by-case decision making
about remedies is inimical to equality. Rather, case-by-case decision
making aspires to a different kind of equality: not the equality of treat-
ing everyone identically, but the equality of treating everyone propor-
tionally.71 That equality of proportionate treatment is expressed in
the maxim that like cases should be treated alike, and unlike cases
should be treated differently. Each equality is a salutary aim that a
legal system could pursue in its design of remedies. But only the
equality of identical treatment can be the subject of a credible prom-
ise by legal decision makers, for ordinary people would have no way to
confirm whether legal decision makers were living up to their promise
of proportionality, not least because of the information costs for the
public in learning about the remedies meted out in particular cases.72
70 Levi discusses other precommitment strategies for quasi-voluntary compliance, but
not this one. See LEVI, supra note 64, at 60-64. On precommitment devices, see generally
JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (rev. ed.
1984);JoN ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CON-
STRAINTS (2000) [hereinafter ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND].
71 The loci classici for the distinction between these two equalities are PLATO, THE
LAWS bk. VI, 756e-758a, at 142-44 (Thomas L. Pangle trans., Basic Books, Inc. 1980) (c.
360 B.C.E.), and ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 2, 1130b-1132b, at 1005-10
(Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans., Modern Library 2001) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
72 Cf Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality ?, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1167,1180
(1983) ("A sense that some people deserve better or worse treatment than others is fairly
common, but rarely is that sense reducible to a quantitative formulation; simple equality
2012]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In short, when remedies are announced, people can see that the
same remedy is given to everyone. They know that in this way the
game is not rigged against the obedient, and they are therefore more
likely to comply with legal rules. Perhaps announcing will even make
the public think that legal decision makers will be fair in other ways
because they have already signaled that they care about fair enforce-
ment.73 These effects come from what could be called the "meta-an-
nouncement" of announcing: an announced remedy communicates
not only what the remedy will be but also that the remedy will be the same
for everyone. Without announcing there is no meta-announcing; legal
decision makers cannot make the critical precommitment.
The strength of this social benefit will vary with the size of the
collective-action problem. It matters less in small groups. In a group
of woodcutters, everyone will know the facts for each rule violation, as
well as the remedy, even if the remedy is decided case by case.74
There will thus be little additional compliance from announcing the
remedy. (An exception would be a small group where the risk of
abuse and favoritism is unusually high, perhaps because the group
self-selects for opportunism-such as pirates. As Peter Leeson has
noted, pirate crews sometimes specified the punishments for various
offenses in their "pirate constitutions. '' 75 Announcing the punish-
ments was a way of limiting "quartermasters ['] discretion in adminis-
tering discipline" and "checking quartermasters['] power for
abuse."76)
In a large group, the compliance benefit will usually be stronger.
Here the group will be less able to follow and assess the remedies pro-
cess-to monitor the monitors-because of higher information costs.
The assurance of equal treatment that is provided by announced rem-
edies will therefore be more valuable.
The strength of this social benefit also depends on how cynical
the public is about legal decision makers' commitment to fairly en-
force the rules of the game. At the extremes, it would be pointless for
has an intuitive appeal as a proper proportion that does not often exist for other explicit
proportions.").
73 On the idea that people are more likely to comply with legal rules when they think
the legal process is fair, see generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW:
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION %WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); ToM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). Or the public might respond in exactly the opposite
way, suspecting that discretion will shift from the remedies to the merits, and the game will
still be rigged. In predicting the reaction, as discussed below, it matters how cynical the
public is.
74 This may explain Ostrom's emphasis on remedial flexibility. See OSTROM, supra
note 59, at 98, 186.
75 Peter T. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization, 115 J.
POL. ECoN. 1049, 1075 (2007).
76 Id.
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legal decision makers to attempt, by announcing, to foster the percep-
tion of equal treatment. When cynicism is very high, the attempt will
not succeed because people will suspect that legal decision makers are
secretly manipulating the levels of enforcement; where cynicism is
very low, the attempt will be unnecessary because people will already
be assuming that legal decision makers are fairly enforcing the rules.
Between these two extremes of cynicism, in large groups, there may be
a significant effect on compliance when legal decision makers foster
the perception of equal treatment. 77
In addition to this quasi-voluntary compliance mechanism, it is
worth noting one other mechanism for how the meta-announcement
of announcing might encourage compliance. Knowing that the rem-
edy is the same for everyone keeps people from making an attribu-
tional mistake. Imagine that A is a blogger who hears that another
blogger, B, after being found liable for defamation, was ordered to
pay hundreds of thousands of dollars. A, who was herself thinking
about writing a post essentially no different from the one that B was
found liable for, might explain away the large award by attributing it
to something peculiar to B. This mistake is not possible when reme-
dies are announced. (Note that self-serving biases could still affect
other aspects of A's interpretation of what happened to B: A might say
"what I did is not illegal" or "I would never be caught.") Thus, an
announced remedy's meta-announcement eliminates one mistake a
person could make in processing information about remedies, there-
fore modestly increasing deterrence. Through these two mechanisms,
quasi-voluntary compliance and prevention of an attributional mis-
take, an announced remedy can increase compliance.
C. Lower Costs of Telling
A further social benefit of announcing is that it reduces what
could be called the "costs of telling." When remedies are tailored case
by case, the parties must make representations about the harm the
violator inflicted because these representations will influence the rem-
edy tailors. This is especially important for the plaintiff: to receive a
remedy, she must tell her story. But telling has its costs.
Consider, for example, a person who has been disabled and seeks
hedonic damages, that is, damages for the loss of enjoyment of life. In
court she must "testify that the injury has made her life less enjoya-
77 Scholars who doubt whether there would be any gain in compliance (given the
potential for manipulation of levels of enforcement) may be identifying themselves as be-
ing more, rather than less, cynical. What is relevant, however, is not the cynicism of an
informed observer of the legal process but rather the level of cynicism in the society at
large.
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ble." 78 As Samuel Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger have argued, this
testimony itself can be "debilitating," for it can "disrupt the hedonic
adaptation process that ensures that most people's happiness re-
bounds after a negative event. '79 Because the remedy is specific to the
particular case, what a person says about her hedonic losses will deter-
mine how much compensation she receives. She is therefore enticed
by the legal process to argue that her life is hopeless, and as she makes
this claim repeatedly and publicly, it can become self-fulfilling.8 0 As
Theodore Dreiser once wrote about a character: "By the natural law
which governs all effort, what he wrote reacted upon him. He began
to feel those subtleties which he could find words to express."81
In contrast, when remedies are announced there will often be no
need for an individualized narrative about the extent of one's injuries
and the hopelessness of one's life. Even if the remedy is announced,
offering such a narrative might sometimes make sense tactically in or-
der to help a plaintiffs chances on the merits. But it will hardly be
the essential requirement that it is when a plaintiff seeks case-specific
hedonic damages. And the extent to which a narrative is useful even
in this way would turn on whether there was a rule or a standard for
liability. A standard paired with an announced remedy would invite
some storytelling and contextualization, though the emphasis will usu-
ally be on the defendant and not on the interior life of the plaintiff. A
ruLe paired with an announced remedy may make it entirely unneces-
sary for the plaintiff to tell her story. In this way and in others, 82 the
choice of a rule or a standard on the merits interacts with the use of
announced remedies.
Hedonic damages for disability are often paired with damages for
a more quantifiable harm (such as medical expenses),83 In some
cases, however, a plaintiff may be seeking a remedy only for a fuzzy,
78 Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 6.
79 Id. But see Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for
Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 555-57 (1987-88) (offering a more
sanguine account of how people reconcile self-empowerment and the rhetorical demands
of claiming disabled status); cf RobertJ. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-
Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 2005 ANN. REv. L. Soc. Sci. 171 (showing that people
desire voice yet arguing that this desire exposes them to manipulation). On the tension
between storytelling and resistance, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Shape Stops Story, 15 NARRATWE
124, 129-31 (2007) (describing "resistance" as an attorney's protection of "her client's
ight not to tell her story").
80 See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 6, at 785-87; Martha Minow, Suruiving Victim
Talk, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1411, 1429 (1993); cf ROBERTJERVIs, SYSTEM EmCTS: COMPLEXITY IN
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 147-49 (1997) (discussing the per se reinforcing nature of in-
formation and descriptions, whether accurate or not).
81 THEODORE DREISER, SISTER CARRIE 193 (Modern Library 1997) (1900).
82 See, e.g., infra Part III.B.1.
83 See, e.g., Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 273 (2006)
("[The tort victim] claimed damages not only for past medical costs, but also for perma-
nent physical injury; future medical expenses; past and future pain, suffering, and mental
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hard-to-measure harm. Think of defamation cases not involving fi-
nancial loss. 84 Subject to constitutional limitations, a plaintiff suing
for defamation may recover "damages for loss of reputation, shame,
mortification, humiliation, loss of standing in the community, and
mental anguish and suffering."85 How can a plaintiff establish these
harms? As the leading treatise on defamation puts it, the plaintiff can
put on evidence of her "avoidance of social contact" or "sleeplessness
and anxiety" or "marital stress" or "change in . . .personality or de-
meanor."8 6 Yet once a plaintiff asserts these injuries and adduces
these kinds of proof, the claims can become self-fulfilling just as in a
disability suit for hedonic damages. 87 Additionally, if the plaintiffs
spouse, friends, colleagues, or clergy give corroborating evidence,8 8
their telling of the plaintiff's story can affect how they perceive and
interact with the plaintiff, further reinforcing her sense of
hopelessness.
In addition, announcing may even have a positive effect on he-
donic adaptation. It could be that announcing generates a social con-
sensus about what is due for a violation. This consensus about
remedies gives a wronged person a criterion for knowing when the
wrong has been set right and thus increases her sense of satisfaction at
receiving the remedy. 89
Even for pecuniary harms, tailoring the remedy can impose "costs
of telling." An example can be seen in Omri Ben-Shahar and Lisa
Bernstein's work on the "secrecy interest" of contracting parties. 90 A
firm that sues for breach of contract will usually want to recover for
lost profits. But establishing lost profits may force the firm to disclose
sensitive business information, "such as materials and labor costs, in-
ventory size, availability of alternative suppliers, the identity of her
downstream contracting partners (customers), and, in the case of
newer businesses, her business plan."9 1 These disclosures are a conse-
anguish; past loss of earnings and working time; and permanent impairment of the ability
to earn in the future.").
84 See I ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS § 10:1 (4th ed. 2011) ("Rarely do damages for libel or slander consist in any
significant part of compensation for measurable pecuniary loss."); id. § 10:3:2 ("[A]ctual
pecuniary loss resulting from defamation is typically difficult to establish.").
85 Id. § 10:5:1.
86 Id. § 10:5:1 & n.200 (noting that successful plaintiffs have produced these kinds of
evidence-the words "marital stress" are quoted from Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 626
N.E.2d 862, 868 (Mass. 1994), where the plaintiff also suffered "physical symptoms").
87 See Minow, supra note 80 (arguing that "victim talk" has a rebounding quality).
88 See SACK, supra note 84, § 10:5:1 n.207.
89 On remedies and social consensus, see infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
90 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law,
109 YALE L.J. 1885, 1885-90 (2000).
91 Id. at 1886; cf Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514 (1980) (per curiam) (con-
cluding that punitive damages would be a deficient remedy in a case where a former CIA
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quence of deciding remedies one case at a time: when the plaintiffs
recovery depends on her particular harms, she must tell her story and
disclose business information.92
The process of tailoring remedies to particular cases is like an
engine. It runs on the representations of the parties; to make the
engine go, the parties must tell their stories. These costly stories can
be avoided when remedies are announced.
III
A THEORY OF ANNOUNCING
The social benefits of announcing-more equality, more compli-
ance, and lower costs of telling-are valuable. Yet announcing also
has its costs, especially the loss of remedial precision. What is needed,
then, is a general theory for when remedies should be announced.
This Part develops that theory. Subpart A explains the diverse set of
functions performed by announcing. Subpart B introduces con-
straints. Subpart C discusses system effects, or the way that announc-
ing one remedy can affect the perception of other remedies. Subpart
D evaluates the intermediate approaches. And subpart E summarizes
the theory.
A. Three Functions
1. The Cost-Saving Function
Announcing can be used to reduce administrative costs. When
remedies are case-specific, litigants must put on evidence about their
particular harms, and the court must decide the remedy anew in every
dispute. In contrast, when remedies are announced, a decision about
the remedy must be made only once.
Scholars writing in the literature on the optimal precision of rem-
edies have done important work related to this point. As noted above,
Spier has demonstrated that "finely tuned" damages can induce liti-
gants to disagree about the appropriate award 93 and that this disagree-
ment can interfere with settlement. Kaplow and Shavell have shown
that litigants do not fully internalize the administrative costs of deter-
mining the remedy.94 As a result, when a legal system pursues a high
degree of accuracy in assessing damages (e.g., by tailoring remedies),
agent was publishing confidential information because proving damages "might force the
Government to disclose some of the very confidences" that were at issue).
92 The contracting parties can attempt to avoid these costs of telling, as Ben-Shahar
and Bernstein note, by using liquidated-damages provisions. See Ben-Shahar & Bernstein,
supra note 90, at 1902-04. On the analogy between announced remedies and liquidated
damages, see supra note 15.
93 See Spier, supra note 2, at 85.
94 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 3.
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it can encourage litigants to engage in wasteful efforts to produce
proof about the severity of injury.95 The work by these scholars does
not need to be repeated here. But several points should be empha-
sized about the cost-saving function of announcing.
First, announcing should perform this function when administra-
tive costs are large relative to the quantum of the remedy. The classic
example is a parking fine, which is usually announced because the
amount is so small compared to the administrative costs of deciding
the fine ex post in every case.
Second, for this function, the aspect of announcing that is domi-
nant is aggregation, not publicity.96 Administrative costs are reduced
by deciding the remedy once for the entire class of cases. Administra-
tive costs are not reduced by communicating the remedy to the pub-
lic. Indeed, publicity can entail additional costs, costs that might not
be justified because the size of the remedy is so small (imagine a park-
ing fine of ten dollars). And even if publicity were costless, the quan-
tum of remedy might still be so insignificant that the mindspace of the
public should not be crowded with the information.
Third, even when announcing should perform this function, it
still might make sense to decide remedies case by case as a "tailoring
experiment." In the experiment, if the distribution of remedies were
narrow, then that distribution would be a useful guide for setting the
level of the announced remedy.97 Or, if the tailoring experiment re-
vealed a bimodal distribution of remedies, there may be grounds for
dividing the two peaks into different legal rules.98 The idea of a tailor-
ing experiment can be put in very practical terms: What would a jury
award in damages when a double-parked car prevents another car
from leaving? What would a jury award in damages (payable to the
state) for parking in an illegal spot? Knowing the answers to these
questions could be useful for legal decision makers even if it was clear
95 See id. at 201. For extensions of this analysis, see Robert A. Mikos, Accuracy in Crimi-
nal Sanctions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW (Alon Harel &
Keith Hylton eds.) (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=1598436, and Amy Whritenour Ando & Wallapak Polasub, Envelope Backs
or the Gold Standard? Choosing the Accuracy of Damage Assessment Methods, 82 LAND ECON. 424
(2006).
96 On the two aspects of announcing, see supra Part I.A.
97 Compare the experiment two decades ago, in asbestos litigation, of trying a hand-
ful of representative claims and using the results to establish valuations for a much larger
set of claims. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 15, at 1626.
98 The tailoring experiment could encourage moral deliberations about the appropri-
ate remedy in keeping with Seana Shiffrin's argument for the deliberative virtue of stan-
dards. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of
Fog, 123 -ARv. L. REv. 1214, 1222 (2010) (arguing that the uncertainty of standards can be
valuable because it requires citizens to grapple with moral concepts). But cf LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 51 (rev. ed. 1969) (arguing that publishing the law uniquely
allows it to be "subject to public criticism").
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that in the long run these remedies should be announced for cost
saving.99
2. The Communication Function
There are remedies and then there are public perceptions of
remedies. The two do not always coincide. A gap between remedy
and perception is a problem chiefly when the potential violators of a
legal rule seriously underestimate what the remedy will be. In such a
scenario, the legal system is leaving deterrence on the table. It is be-
ing secretly severe, yet without gaining that severity's effect on poten-
tial violators. And the legal system is failing to provide a basic good of
human societies: making sure citizens know the legal consequences of
their actions. 100 A gap between the reality and perception of reme-
dies can therefore strike at the heart of a society's ability to control
human behavior through law.
Consider a blogger who is thinking about writing a salacious and
defamatory post. How likely is the blogger to be able to predict the
remedy (assuming she would be found liable)? The blogger has prob-
ably never been sued for defamation, so learning from experience is
unlikely. Nor can the blogger make a reasonable inference from the
remedies in defamation suits against other people. Even if the blog-
ger knew what the damage awards were in other cases, she would still
need to know how much her own case would be like those cases on
many dimensions-egregiousness of violation, characteristics of de-
fendant, skill of legal counsel, identity of legal decision maker, and so
on. The blogger would have to swim through a huge sea of litigation
flotsam and jetsam, all of which is marginally relevant but none of
which is very helpful for predicting the remedy in her own case.
The point can be described in more formal terms with reference
to the literature on information overload for consumers. This litera-
99 In the experiment, whether the distribution of remedies is narrow or broad may
depend on who makes the case-by-case decisions and what procedures are used.
100 See TIMOTHY A.O. ENnico-rr, VAGUENESS IN LAw 185 (2000) (finding a consensus
that the "organizing principle" of the rule of law's requirements is that "the law must be
capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects" (quoting RAZ, supra note 27, at 214)).
Some have argued that predictability matters less for remedies than for substantive rules.
See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, Should Like Cases Be Treated Alike?, 11 LEGAL THEORY 27, 33-34
(2005) (arguing that allowing potential criminals to accurately predict their punishment
would probably not enhance the deterrent effect of the criminal system); Shiffrin, supra
note 98, at 1241-43 (arguing that people have a legitimate interest in sufficient notice to
plan their conduct but not in predicting specific remedies). Such arguments may have
merit in criminal and quasi-criminal contexts, but they have less force for ordinary civil
violations, especially in situations where the harm to which the remedy corresponds is radi-
cally indeterminate. That is, it can be good for people to know not only that the law pros-
cribes certain conduct, but also the intensity with which it does so (as expressed through
the choice and quantum of remedy). Cf infra note 114 and accompanying text (noting
that it is more difficult to intuit a remedy than a substantive rule).
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ture distinguishes between information quantity and information
quality.10 1 All else being equal, giving consumers a higher quantity of
information reduces their decision-making effectiveness. 102 But giv-
ing them a higher quality of information does the reverse; it makes
their decision making more effective. 10 3 For a blogger trying to pre-
dict a tailored remedy for defamation, the quantity of relevant infor-
mation is enormous, but all of it is of relatively low quality (for the
purpose of knowing what the remedy will be in her own case).104
The blogger might rely on an information intermediary-an at-
torney-to predict what the remedy would be. 10 5 But the blogger
would have to delay publishing the post and would have to pay for
legal advice, and at any rate the blogger would still be concluding on
her own that the potential liability is great enough to justify talking to
an attorney in the first place. For millions of bloggers, this is not a
realistic solution. Their notions about remedies may be extremely
rough and inexact, but they are the medium through which law's de-
terrence must move.
Now assume arguendo that most bloggers radically underestimate
the damages that are awarded for defamatory posts. 10 6 To the extent
101 See, e.g., Kevin Lane Keller & Richard Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of Infor-
mation on Decision Effectiveness, 14J. CONSUMER RES. 200, 200 (1987). This literature exam-
ines the processing of information for a different decision-not a citizen's decision to
comply with a legal rule, but a consumer's choice of goods. Nevertheless, the need to
gather and process information is common to both decisions.
102 See id. at 211; see also Nicholas H. Lurie, Decision Making in Information-Rich Environ-
ments: The Role of Information Structure, 30J. CONSUMER RES. 473 (2004) (adding analysis of
information structure and, though contradicting Keller and Staelin on one point, support-
ing the thesis that a higher quantity of information can impair decision making and in-
crease its costs).
103 See Keller & Staelin, supra note 101, at 211.
104 Cf Robert J. MacCoun, Media Reporting ofJury Verdicts: Is the Tail (of the Distribution)
Wagging the Dog?, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 539, 540 (2006) ("Yet even today, there is no simple
way to statistically forecast the expected value of any given case-the published data are
inevitably dated, and they do not readily permit one to project the combined effects of case
type, jurisdiction, and injury characteristics, much less a host of other potentially relevant
factors not coded by the researchers.").
105 The literature on legal advice is diverse in its conclusions and methods. Good start-
ing points are Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex
Ante Legal Advice, 8J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 306 (1992), and William H. Simon, The Market forBad
Legal Advice: Academic Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60 STAN. L. REv.
1555 (2008).
106 Little is known about bloggers' perceptions. As of November 2009, there were "109
pending or resolved [defamation] cases against bloggers." Kaitlin M. Gurney, Comment,
MySpace, Your Reputation: A Call to Change Libel Laws for Juveniles Using Social Networking Sites,
82 TEMP. L. REv. 241, 255-56 (2009) (noting also "an $11.3 million verdict against a Flor-
ida woman in 2006 stemming from defamatory statements she posted on an online bulletin
board"). A Twitter defamation case recently settled for nearly half a million dollars. See
Matthew Perpetua, Courtney Love Settles Twitter Defamation Suit For $430,000, ROLLING STONE
(Mar. 3, 2011, 6:35 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/courtney-love-settles-
twitter-defamation-suit-for-430-000-20110303. It is worth noting, though, that media cover-
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that these damages are meant to deter violations, the legal system will
fail to get the deterrent force it should, and bloggers who are found
liable for defamation will be understandably shocked to discover what
they must pay. These deterrence and fairness problems could be ad-
dressed, however, by announcing the remedy. Legal decision makers
could look to past awards, perhaps setting the announced remedy at
the level of the median award for a defamatory post. Of course, there
would be some loss of remedial precision, for the announced remedy
would be too high in some cases and too low in others. But to a signif-
icant degree that is true even now, when the remedy is decided case
by case, because the harms caused by defamation are so indetermi-
nate.107 And if the remedy were announced, news of it would travel
quickly through the blogosphere. The gap between remedy and per-
ception would be erased.108
The bottom line is that when potential violators seriously under-
estimate the remedy, legal decision makers will often be better off an-
nouncing instead of deciding the remedy case by case. But when,
exactly, is this likely to occur? With due recognition that this inquiry
is ultimately contextual and empirical, a theoretical foundation can be
laid here for future investigations.
It is important to demarcate two broad categories of cases in
which the relevant public is not likely to underestimate the remedy.
One category is cases in which the potential violators of the legal rule
are sophisticated repeat players. Consider, for example, Ford Motor
Company and a Mafia family, both of which are sophisticated parties
in the "market" for legal violations. Both face competitive pressures
to acquire information about remedies. 10 9 If Ford systematically over-
or underestimates what it will have to pay for breaching contracts with
suppliers, in the long run it will be at a disadvantage relative to a rival
carmaker. If a Mafia family systematically over- or underestimates the
criminal penalties that its hit men will incur, it will be disadvantaged
in the long run relative to other Mafia families. 10 Both are repeat
players. They learn from their violations,1 1 ' and the information they
age of outlier verdicts may eventually lead to bloggers' overestimating the damages for de-
famatory posts. See MacCoun, supra note 104, at 558-61.
107 See supra Part I.B; see also supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
108 This sketch of the decision to announce is simplified to illustrate the communica-
tion function. Other relevant considerations are discussed below, including constraints
and system effects. See infra Part III.B-C.
109 Cf RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, PREDICTABLY RATIONAL?: IN SEARCH OF DEFENSES FOR RA-
TIONAL BEHAVIOR IN ECONOMICS, at xiv-xv (2010) (advancing this competitive-pressure ar-
gument for the rationality assumption in neoclassical economics).
110 This is one reason that individual criminals are ignorant of legal penalties while
criminal syndicates are more likely to acquire this information.
III See generally Omri Ben-Shahar, Playing Without a Rulebook: Optimal Enforcement When
Individuals Learn the Penalty Only by Committing the Crime, 17 lTrr'L REV. L. & ECON. 409
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procure once about remedies can be used over and over again. 112 For
such actors, then, there will be little ignorance about remedies to
"cure" via announcing.
Another category is cases in which the legal remedy is able to
track a social consensus. As in the ancient example of the lex talionis,
there might be a social consensus that the remedy for taking another's
eye is the loss of your own eye. Or there might be a social consensus
that the remedy for stealing a boat is returning the very same boat
(instead of, say, paying its value). Or that the remedy for slandering
someone is a public apology in the same medium. In each of these
examples, a social consensus is achievable because the remedy does
not scale. If the violation were a little worse than usual, the violator
would not have to give 110% of an eye or a boat or an apology. 113
And in each example the remedy is in the same "currency" as the loss:
eye for eye, boat for boat, repair of reputation for loss of reputation.
This kind of convergence between legal remedy and social con-
sensus is fairly unusual, though, in modern American law. Most viola-
tions are translated into another currency, usually money, and money
scales continuously. Because of the lack of convergence, there is an
important difference in American law between substantive require-
ments and remedies. Substantive requirements will often track a so-
cial norm. It is therefore easier for the public to intuit them.
Consider a law against defaming your neighbor or a law requiring in-
fants to ride in car seats or a law prohibiting the hacking of another
person's email account. All of these laws track, sometimes closely and
sometimes roughly, a social norm.
For violations of each of these laws, what should be the remedy?
Should it be monetary? On these questions there is no social norm or
consensus. Generally speaking, whenever remedies are translated into
dollars (or into continuously scaling units of time, as in a prison sen-
tence), it will be hard for the public to intuit what the remedy is. And
social consensus about the remedy will therefore prove elusive-or at
least, more elusive than a social consensus about the rule of
behavior. 114
(1997) (showing that apprehension can give criminals opportunities to learn about en-
forcement policies).
112 On returns to scale from information, see Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Infor-
mation: An Exposition, 23 EMPIRICA 119, 123-25 (1996).
113 There will, of course, be boundary questions: What if the eye or the boat or the
reputation was already injured? But in the central case, the remedy is binary-giving back
versus not giving back the boat, for example-and by stipulation the social consensus is
that if A took the boat, A will have to give it back.
114 This lack of convergence between the legal remedy and a social consensus may
mean that communication should occupy a more central place in normative theory about
remedies than it does in the merits-focused literature on rules and standards.
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And where there is no convergence between legal remedy and
social consensus, unsophisticated actors can face high information
costs and low returns from learning about remedies. Information
costs can be high because these actors lack background knowledge
and specific expertise in acquiring information about the remedies
that are being handed out. The returns can be low because, unlike
Henry Ford or Don Corleone, they cannot use the information about
remedies repeatedly over a broad range of conduct.1 15
Of course, if unsophisticated potential violators are ignorant
about remedies, it does not automatically follow that they will be seri-
ously underestimating them. But it needs to be taken seriously as a
possibility since there are mechanisms by which this could happen.
For instance, the relevant public for a legal rule might suffer from
optimism bias. Or, in the words of Beccaria, uncertainty about penal-
ties can spur people to violate the law since "ignorance and uncer-
tainty of punishment open[ ] the way to the eloquence of the
emotions."116
In short, when potential violators, for whatever reason, seriously
underestimate the remedies for violation, the remedy can be an-
nounced as a means of reducing information costs and improving
communication. This function of announcing is not a rejection of
optimal deterrence but rather an indirect way of achieving it.117
115 See Arrow, supra note 112. On the importance of audience on information costs,
see generally Henry E. Smith, The Language of Prperty: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1105 (2003).
116 BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 17 (Richard Bellamy
ed., Richard Davies et al. trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764). People may be de-
terred more by certain remedies than by uncertain ones of equal expected value; support-
ing this conclusion are behavioral findings about salience and prospect theory (with its
claim that people are generally risk-averse with respect to gains but risk-seeking with re-
spect to losses). See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RisK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992) (updating pros-
pect theory). Alternatively, people may be more deterred by uncertain remedies; support-
ing this conclusion are findings of uncertainty aversion and the various qualifications to
prospect theory (e.g., options in framing, different results for low-probability risks, and the
effect of decision-maker expertise). See, e.g., John A. List, Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect
Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 615, 624 (2004) (finding pros-
pect theory less applicable for experienced decision makers). The argument in this Article
does not depend on any view of whether people are usually more deterred by certain or
uncertain remedies. For a recent survey of the empirical evidence on deterrence and cer-
tainty, in the context of the criminal law, see Steven D. Levitt & ThomasJ. Miles, Empirical
Study of Criminal Punishment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 455 (A. Mitchell Po-
linsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); see also Francesco Drago et al., The Deterrent Effects of
Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 117J. POL. ECON. 257 (2009) (finding evidence of
deterrence when prisoners were released early and knew the exact quantum of time that
would be added to their prison sentences if they reoffended).
117 Compare Dick Craswell's point that "a reform that seems obviously unsound from
the standpoint of one route to optimal deterrence could be perfectly sound from the
standpoint of another." Craswell, supra note 26, at 2210.
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When legal decision makers choose this indirect approach, they lose
the power to make distinctions between violators in particular
cases.' 18 What they gain is an assurance that the perception of reme-
dies will live up to the reality.
3. The Precommitment Function
The two functions of announcing discussed so far are addressed
to the smallest remedies (cost-saving) and the least sophisticated audi-
ences (communication). Announcing performs a very different func-
tion at the opposite end of these spectra-when the remedy is massive
and the audience is highly sophisticated. Here, announcing can work
as a precommitment device.
In understanding this function, the starting point is Bob Cooter's
distinction between two situations. 119 In the first, legal decision mak-
ers know the external costs of conduct, but they do not know what the
socially optimal conduct is.120 In the second, legal decision makers
know the socially optimal conduct, but they do not know the external
costs of suboptimal conduct.121 In this latter situation, Cooter says, it
is appropriate to use "sanctions," which are costs for doing what is
forbidden, and which can escalate for intentional or repeated
violations. 122
In a sanctions situation, legal decision makers may want to throw
the book at violators. After all, what the remedy would deter is, by
definition, a deviation from the socially optimal behavior. In fact, le-
gal decision makers may want to threaten a very high, almost Becker-
esque sanction12 3-a sanction so high that it deters essentially all
violations of the legal rule.
But the threat of a high sanction is usually not credible. If legal
decision makers are determining remedies case by case, they face two
severe constraints on their ability to mete out a high sanction.
118 See supra Part I.B.
119 Cooter, supra note 7, at 1533. Cooter's piece is usually invoked for the dichotomy
between prices and sanctions. For a normative theory about announcing, what is more
useful is Cooter's distinction between the situations in which prices and sanctions should be
used. Id.
120 Id. Think of driving and smog: legal decision makers might know the costs of driv-
ing a mile in terms of statistical lives lost from smog, but they do not know how many miles
it would be socially optimal for drivers to travel.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1537-38.
123 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 180 (1968). Since Becker's article began the modern turn toward optimal deterrence,
other scholars have offered many qualifications of its argument for maximal fines. E.g.,
Steven Shavell, A Note on Marginal Deterrence, 12 INm'L REv. L. & ECON. 345, 346-47 (1992).
The high sanction referenced in the text would be "almost Beckeresque" because there are
points of departure from Becker's argument: one is that the high sanction should not be
overused; another is that enforcement is not reduced.
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One is time-inconsistent preferences. Today, legal decision mak-
ers may want to threaten a high sanction for violations of a legal rule.
But tomorrow they will not exact such a remedy when they are faced
with an actual defendant. 124 It is one thing to say that any retailer who
violates a legal rule should be put out of business. It is another to say
that this retailer, who has a business at this intersection and employs
these three-dozen people, should be put out of business.
The second constraint is institutional. One institution may know
the socially optimal behavior and want to threaten a high sanction-
the legislature. But it is another institution that will determine the
quantum of remedy in a particular case. Even if the legislature could
credibly signal its willingness to carry out a high sanction, that would
hardly signal the willingness of ajury not yet in being to do the same.
The upshot of these constraints is that when remedies are determined
case by case, any threat of a high sanction is not credible.
These constraints could be evaded if legal decision makers could
precommit to giving a high sanction. The precommitment device that
legal decision makers need is announcing. When they announce the
remedy in advance, they are eliminating options they would otherwise
have. 125 Legal decision makers are deciding (at time 1) to eliminate
the option (at time 2) of giving what will seem to be the appropriate
remedy in a particular case. To paraphrase Jon Elster, when legal de-
cision makers announce a high sanction, they are rationally commit-
ting themselves to be irrational. 126
Announcing a high sanction will work only in the right circum-
stances. First, the threat has to actually "get through" to the relevant
public, which is more likely if that public is made up of sophisticated
repeat players. Second, for the threat to be credible, it cannot be
used indiscriminately and for trivial violations. It has been said of
eighteenth-century England that the death penalty could deter a mur-
derer but not a pickpocket. 127 Third, announcing works best as a
precommitment device when compliance with a legal rule is effec-
tively a one-time decision.
A statute that illustrates this function is the Right to Financial Pri-
vacy Act of 1978.128 The Act prohibits financial institutions from dis-
124 ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND, supra note 70, at 34-45. This failure to give a high
sanction could also be considered weakness of will. See id. at 9.
125 On "the elimination of options" as a precommitment device, see id. at 41.
126 Id. at 24.
127 See Kennedy, supra note 42, at 1696 ("Death is likely to be an ineffective penalty for
theft."); see also Douglas Hay, Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL
TREE 17, 22-23 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975) (noting that the death penalty was pre-
scribed for many property crimes in eighteenth-century England but was applied only
rarely).
128 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2006).
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closing certain customer records to the government. 29 Pursuant to
the statute, a financial institution can avoid liability by relying in good
faith upon a certificate of compliance from a government
authority. 30
This is a classic sanctions situation. It is hard to measure the ex-
ternal costs of a bank illegally disclosing a person's financial records
to the government. Some of the harms sound in dignity and privacy.
Other harms are pecuniary but may be hard to quantify because they
are diffuse and probabilistic, and because they extend into the future.
Imagine, for example, that a bank illegally discloses customers'
records to the IRS, that doing so increases the risk of an audit, that
the customers are in fact audited (but was it because of the disclo-
sure?), and that they must pay accountants and suffer sharply reduced
credit scores. It is relatively easy, though, for legal decision makers to
know what the socially optimal behavior is: a bank should never turn
over customer records to the government without a certificate of
compliance. 3 1
The Right to Financial Privacy Act coerces obedience by an-
nouncing a high sanction. Customers whose records are illegally dis-
closed can sue the government agency or financial institution for
statutory damages of $100 per violation, with the real bite being the
possibility of a class action for millions of dollars in statutory dam-
ages. 132 Here, the law is speaking to sophisticated repeat players, vio-
lations are serious, and compliance is essentially a one-time decision
to adopt policies and controls that prevent the disclosure of customer
records to the government.' 33
129 Id. § 3403(a); L. RICHARD FISCHER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY: A COMPLIANCE
GUIDE 2.01, at 2-3 (2d ed. 1991).
130 12 U.S.C. § 3417(c); see also FISCHER, supra note 129, 2.07[1], at 2-126.
131 The certificate-of-compliance provision has been criticized by one commentator
for how it "significantly limits the bank customer's ability to obtain relief for unauthorized
disclosures." Michael Rogovin, Privacy of Financial Records, 1986 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 587, 591.
But that provision is critical to the remedial scheme: it limits the prohibition to conduct
that legal decision makers know is not socially optimal and thus makes it appropriate to
impose a high sanction.
132 E.g., Complaint at 16-21, Stein v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:11-cv-01400 (D.D.C.
Aug. 2, 2011), 2011 WL 3323841. The statute also authorizes punitive damages and actual
damages. See 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a)(2)-(3). The former are rare, and the latter are hard to
prove. A case in point is Neece v. IRS, 41 F.3d 1396, 1399 (10th Cir. 1994), where the
plaintiffs claimed $1.2 million in actual damages under the Act but recovered only the cost
of repairing vehicles seized by the IRS-a mere $1,580.
133 Note how different this normative analysis is from the rules/standards literature on
substantive legal requirements. Louis Kaplow has written that the most important norma-
tive consideration in choosing a rule or a standard is "the frequency with which a law will
govern conduct" (with greater frequency indicating a need for rules). Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557, 621 (1992). In contrast, for the
precommitment function of announcing, the frequency of the underlying conduct is at
best a tertiary consideration, and in the Right to Financial Privacy Act example above, the
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Another statute that illustrates the precommitment function is
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003.134 Until re-
cently, retailers often printed on each receipt the customer's full
credit card number and other identifying information. This practice
was prohibited by the Act.135 The socially optimal conduct is clear-
do not print the information. It is not clear, however, what the exter-
nal costs are. A customer's bank or credit card company might cover
immediate financial losses, but the customer might still experience a
loss of dignity and autonomy, as well as future financial losses, the loss
of time spent reviewing and altering her financial life, the cost of pro-
tective countermeasures such as password software, and perhaps even
a brooding sense of unease with commercial transactions.
Yet no jury is going to put a grocery store out of business because
of what it prints on receipts. Retailers know this. For the Holmesian
bad retailer, 1 36 the rational response would likely be to go on printing
receipts with all of the customers' identifying information, while wait-
ing to see what remedies are meted out under the statute. The ra-
tional response for the Holmesian bad retailer would change,
however, if legal decision makers committed themselves to awarding a
high sanction, no matter how justified or unjustified it was in a partic-
ular case.
This is effectively what the statute does. Among the remedies
made available to customers are statutory damages of at least $100 per
violation.1 37 When aggregated in a class action, these damages are so
massive that they would put out of business even a large grocery store
chain. 138 Legal decision makers have precommitted themselves to
give extravagant remedies as a way to coerce immediate compliance.
Again, the relevant audience is sophisticated, 139 violations are non-
trivial (because identity theft is serious), and compliance with the Act
is essentially a one-time decision to upgrade equipment.
remedy is announced in order to ensure that the incidence of the underlying conduct
approaches zero.
134 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006).
135 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g).
136 For the generative text for the "Holmesian bad man," see Holmes, supra note 14, at
459-61.
137 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A); see also Scheuerman, supra note 4, at 105.
138 Scheuerman, supra note 4, at 105-06 ("When pursued as a nationwide or statewide
class action, the statutory damages [under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act]
create devastating liability that would put the defendant out of business simply for failing
to redact information from a retail receipt."). On the intersection of statutory damages
and class actions, see id. at 107-15, and Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State
Defiance: Punitive Damages in the Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, 46 WIL[AMETrE L. REv.
449, 471 n.104 (2010).
139 Some retailers are less sophisticated, but other actors (e.g., trade groups and manu-
facturers of cash registers) have an incentive to inform them of the remedy.
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Recognition of this precommitment function is strikingly absent
from the existing scholarship on the Fair and Accurate Credit Trans-
actions Act and the Right to Financial Privacy Act. Legal scholars have
sharply criticized both statutes and have called for the application of
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on punitive damages, including a
particularized assessment of the injury suffered by each plaintiff.140
What these scholars are objecting to is the disconnect between the
meager provable harm in a particular case and a staggering award of
damages. What these scholars are missing is the precommitment
function of announcing.
In both examples, it is not that announcing works because it ap-
proximates the measurable harm in the median case. Nor is announc-
ing working in spite of its failure to approximate the measurable
harm. Rather, these announced remedies can be successful because
they exceed the measurable harm in actual cases. The high, even excessive,
announced remedy is meant to front-load compliance by sophisti-
cated actors; once this is achieved, the remedy will in effect no longer
be needed. The law is announcing in terrorem.14 1
4. Summary
"Announcing" is a term that can be applied to three very differ-
ent strategies. For announcing as cost saving, the remedy is decided
in the aggregate in order to solve a problem of high administrative
costs. For announcing as communication, the remedy is decided in
the aggregate and publicized in order to solve a different problem-
140 See Chaplin, supra note 4; Scheuerman, supra note 4. For similar criticisms of statu-
tory damages for copyright infringement, see Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 4. Fed-
eral courts have traditionally reviewed statutory damage awards under a highly deferential
standard. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919)
(stating that the statutory damage award must be "so severe and oppressive as to be wholly
disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable" to justify deviation from it).
As a general rule, moving to a more vigorous form of constitutional review (or, for that
matter, more frequent use of remittitur) would make it difficult for announced remedies
to serve any of the three functions described in this Article. Administrative costs would
increase both for litigants and the public because parties would brief and judges would
decide another set of questions in every case. Information costs would go up because it
would be harder for potential violators to predict what the remedy would ultimately be. See
Ronen Avraham & Alvaro Bustos, The Unexpected Effects of Caps on Non-Economic Damages, 30
INTr'L REV. L. & ECON. 291 (2010). And precommitment would be impossible because even
if legal decision makers tried to commit themselves to a high sanction at time 1, the com-
mitment could be unraveled by courts at time 2.
141 The precommitment described here is possible only for remedies, not for substan-
tive legal requirements. Legal decision makers could choose an inappropriate rule,
thereby committing themselves to be irrational (e.g., a twenty-mph speed limit on a high-
way). But that irrationality would not by itself promote immediate compliance; there
would also have to be a commitment to a high remedy. The remedy, not the use of a rule,
would be achieving most of the in terrorem effect. For more on the interplay of announced
remedies with rules and standards, see infra Part III.B.1.
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the serious underestimation of the remedy by the relevant public. For
announcing as precommitment, the remedy is decided in the aggre-
gate and publicized in order to solve a problem internal to legal deci-
sion makers themselves-their inability to credibly commit to giving a
high sanction.
Each function achieves a different mix of the social benefits of
announcing described in Part II. The cost-saving function achieves
greater equality. But it is unlikely to increase compliance if the rem-
edy is not publicized. And it is unlikely to have much effect on the
costs of telling because the amount at stake is just too small to make
"telling" worthwhile in the first place. The communication function
achieves all three social benefits: greater equality, greater compliance,
and reduced costs of telling. The precommitment function achieves
the equality and compliance benefits. Whether the costs of telling will
be reduced is more contextual. For a bank or retailer, hedonic adap-
tion is not a useful construct. But there may still be reduced costs of
telling along the lines of the secrecy interest described by Bernstein
and Ben-Shahar. 142
These functions also require different kinds of competence from
legal decision makers. The cost-saving and communication functions
require that legal decision makers be good at setting the fixed remedy
since the exact level of the remedy will affect the behavior of potential
violators at the margin. The precommitment function requires that
legal decision makers be good at determining what the optimal behav-
ior is, but it does not require the same competence for setting the
exact level of the remedy. After all, the point of the high sanction is
that it should be sufficiently high that potential violators are not faced
with a close call about whether to comply. These three functions of
announcing therefore vary in their benefits and institutional
demands.
B. Three Constraints
1. Interplay of Rights and Remedies
Whether a remedy should be announced turns not only on the
functions it would serve but also on the breadth of conduct that would
be covered.
To return to the example of defamation by bloggers, 143 an an-
nounced remedy would be more appropriate for defamatory posts
than for all cases of defamation in all media. To raise the level of
generality still further, there should certainly not be a single an-
142 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
143 See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the effect announced remedies would have on
bloggers).
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nounced remedy for something like "all cases of intangible injury to
another person." The range of phenomena covered by one remedy
would simply be too wide (or, put differently, the legitimate range of
variation between cases would be too great).1 44
Or imagine a single announced remedy for breaches of con-
tract-say, for example, $1 million. This would radically overcompen-
sate and overdeter in the case of an owner of a food truck thinking of
breaking her contract with a supplier of paper plates. But it would
radically undercompensate and underdeter in the case of a mammoth
corporation like Apple deciding whether to breach a major contract
with a supplier. (A single announced remedy for breaches of contract
could operate, however, as a default rule to force contracting parties
to use liquidated-damages provisions.)
Where exactly this is true-that is, where the range of phenom-
ena becomes too much for a single announced remedy-is a matter of
judgment. This judgment call is nonetheless crucial for deciding
whether to announce.
Another way to put this is that it matters how the "legal violation"
space is carved up among different kinds of claims. Where there is a
single kind of legal claim that covers conduct for which there will be a
wide range of diverse phenomena (e.g., breach of contract or
fraud 45 ), the remedial precision offered by tailoring is more valuable.
The hard work of differentiating cases is being done at the back end
instead of up front with a distinction between different kinds of
claims. 146 But where the legal-violation space is carved up into an ar-
ray of legal claims, each fairly precise, it is likely that there will be a
narrower range of phenomena covered by each claim. Then the case
for announcing the remedy for any given claim will be stronger. Also
relevant is the degree to which legal claims are overlapping. Where a
single act might give rise to a number of different legal claims (or
causes of action), announcing the remedy for any one of those legal
144 Or to put it still another way, even if the announced remedy was set at the right
level for the median case, the number and magnitude of Type 1 (overcompensation for a
minor injury) and Type 2 (undercompensation for a major injury) errors would lead to
serious deterrence problems. See Avraham, supra note 35, at 102 & n.74.
145 See 2 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 408
(Richmond, Shepherd & Colin 3d ed. 1846) (quoting a letter from Lord Hardwicke to
Lord Kaimes for the proposition that because "fraud is infinite," no one could ever "lay
down as a general proposition what constitutes fraud, or establish any invariable rule which
should define it").
146 For an insightful discussion of these tradeoffs in the context of willful breaches of
contract, see Richard Craswell, When Is a Willful Breach "Willful"? The Link Between Definitions
and Damages, 107 MicH. L. REv. 1501 (2009).
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claims will do little to reduce inequality, the perception of inequality,
and the costs of telling.' 47
And there is another interplay between announcing and substan-
tive legal requirements. If the substantive legal requirement is a stan-
dard, rather than a rule, the effects of announcing will be diminished.
For example, the perception of equal treatment might not be as
strong if the public suspects favoritism and bias in the application of
the standard. A standard would also increase the costs of telling be-
cause it encourages storytelling and contextualization on the mer-
its. 14 8 The use of a standard would also make it harder for legal
decision makers to really precommit to giving a high sanction. Discre-
tion could shift hydraulically from the remedy to the merits if the
pressure is great enough-as it often will be in the precommitment
cases. In contrast, using a rule makes each of the advantages and
functions of announcing stronger. But also more brittle. A rule
means there is no merits-stage safety valve if the announced remedy
proves far too harsh. Whether legal decision makers should double
down on announcing (by using a rule) or soften its edges (by using a
standard) will depend on context.
2. Future Proofing
Announcing can produce an enduring change in public expecta-
tions about remedies, but this durability has its disadvantages. An an-
nounced remedy is like a drug that acts quickly, immediately entering
the blood stream and affecting the patient, but also staying in the pa-
tient's system for a long time. It may outlast changes in culture or
technology or the real value of money, and the level of an announced
remedy that today seems perfectly sensible might one day be a ridicu-
lous anachronism.
In the United States, the future-proofing problem is familiar from
the Seventh Amendment's preservation of the right to a civil jury trial
"where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars. ' 149 This
number has never been updated, and though it once represented a
large sum of money, it is now equivalent to less than ninety seconds of
billable time for leading attorneys.
An illustration from Roman law is more connected to remedies.
The Twelve Tables assigned fixed penalties for several kinds of
wrongs, but the devaluation of the currency between the fifth and late
third centuries B.C.E. made the penalties very much out of date. 150
147 This is a major problem with announcing in modem American criminal law. See
infra note 171.
148 See supra text accompanying note 82.
149 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
150 See AlAN WATSON, LAW MAKING IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC 46-49 (1974).
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One Roman jurist tells the story of a young man named Veratius, in a
time when the penalty of twenty-five asses (the as being a Roman coin)
was no longer a great sum. Veratius "amused himself by striking pass-
ers-by in the face while a slave followed him with a purse full of asses
and counted out twenty-five to each victim, according to the law of the
XII Tables."1 51
A similar point regarding the need for updating could be made
about time-delimited remedies, such as a ten-year suspension from
professional activity. If the lifespan in a country changes dramatically
in either direction, then old time-delimited remedies may become
absurd.
How, then, does a legal system ensure that announced remedies
are updated over time? Lawmakers have two choices, each with its
own costs. One is to have a regular and automatic form of updating,
much like cost-of-living increases for Social Security.15 2 There could
be a small notice-such as "Updated Annually"-that accompanies
the announcement of the remedy, thus telling the public that there
will be continual modernization. Creativity will be necessary because
the consumer price index will hardly be a good mechanism for updat-
ing every remedy. For example, it is not clear that a fine for unsafe
working conditions in mines or on oil rigs should stay the same, even
while the value of the mining or drilling operation expands dramati-
cally. If the civil penalties for unsafe working conditions are to keep
pace with the potentially offsetting economic incentives of manage-
ment, the penalties might be indexed to the value of the mine or well,
and so on.153 Automatic updating will work better when a legal rule
151 Id. at 46. The primary source is 3 AuLus GELLIUS, THE ATric NIGHTS, bk. XX.1.13,
at 410-13 (John C. Rolfe trans., rev. ed. 1978) (c. 165 A.D.). On analogues in other an-
cient legal systems, see generally Martha T. Roth, Mesopotamian Legal Traditions and the Laws
of Hammurabi, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 13 (1995).
152 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 64-68 (1982) (out-
lining the complexities and tradeoffs of automatic updating); see also KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW
AND INFLATION 247-50 (1982) (making the case for automatic updating through an exam-
ple of a negligence victim receiving meager compensation due to a damage-limitation pro-
vision that did not adjust for inflation). See generally Jim Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic
Imprecision: How Should the Law Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS LJ. 1375 (2003) (suggesting
ways courts can address inflation). Note that although announced remedies are especially
vulnerable to inflation (or deflation), similar problems can arise when remedies are de-
cided case by case. Compare Melvin M. Belli, The Adequate Award, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 3-5
(1951) (decrying the fact that damage awards had not kept up with the cost of living), with
Deborah R. Hensler, Jurors in the Material World: Putting Tort Verdicts in Their Social Context,
13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 8, 19 (2008) (noting growth in size of damage awards, even
after inflation is taken into account).
153 Perhaps taking inspiration from the Income Tax space in the game Monopoly, Con-
gress has specified that the maximum amount of statutory damages in class actions under
the Truth in Lending Act is "the lesser of $500,000 or I per centum of the net worth of the
creditor." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2) (B) (2006). In other contexts it may be appropriate to
use the greater of a fixed amount and a percentage of profit or net worth.
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regulates the conduct of only a small slice of the public, for the infor-
mation costs of keeping up with the remedy will be high and the fre-
quent updating and lack of round numbers will decrease the salience
that the announced remedy might otherwise have had.
The other way to update an announced remedy is to do so less
frequently but in larger jumps. Imagine updating fines every thirty
years. Here, the information costs are kept low because a person's
knowledge will remain accurate for a long time. But of course this
means that the remedy should be set too high at first and then it will
become too low as the years run by. Once again, we meet the ines-
capable tension between remedial precision and remedial communi-
cation. When announced remedies are updated frequently, a legal
system emphasizes precision over communication; when they are not
updated frequently, the reverse is true. Which value a legal system
should prioritize (after it has already made the decision to announce)
will depend primarily on whether the relevant public is small or large
(as a proxy for the degree to which the relevant public will learn
about and respond to more frequent updates).
3. Crowding Out Social Norms
One more constraint warrants mention, though this one is more
chimerical than real. Some readers may be concerned that if reme-
dies were announced, then potential violators would come to see the
remedy as merely a price to be paid, as a cost of doing business. This
concern might be phrased in terms of diminished respect for the law,
or in terms of social norms being crowded out by a solipsistic calcula-
tion of legal consequences. In either form, the idea is that announced
remedies will make people think of lawbreaking as just another com-
modity for sale.
This idea might seem to gain support from Uri Gneezy and Aldo
Rustichini's famous daycare experiment. 154 Some of the daycares in
the experiment set a fine for parents who were late picking up their
children. 155 The fine did not decrease the behavior. In fact, in the
daycares that adopted the fine, the percentage of parents who were
late actually increased because the fine crowded out the social norm
against being late to pick up one's children. 156 Are announced reme-
dies counterproductive like the fines in the experiment, seeming to
deter but really only leading to more violations?
The answer is no, at least as a general matter, for there is a critical
difference between announced remedies and the fines in Gneezy and
Rustichini's experiment. In their experiment, the fine replaced a re-
154 UI Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
155 Id. at 1.
156 Id. at 3, 14.
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gime of no formal penalties at all, 157 not a regime of penalties deter-
mined case by case. In other words, the choice that the daycare
operators faced was whether to rely solely on social norms or to add a
formal penalty (the fine). When legal decision makers are deciding
whether or not the remedy should be announced, they have already
moved past the point of relying solely on social norms and are impos-
ing legal penalties.
C. System Effects
The analysis so far has considered the desirability of announcing
for individual legal rules. But the decision to announce the remedy
for one legal rule depends in part on whether the remedies for other
legal rules are announced. Remedies in a particular society are a sys-
tem, and choices about one remedy will have "system effects."
158
These choices affect one another in several interconnected ways.
1. Diminishing Returns and High Priorities
Given the limited amount of information that human beings can
process, there are diminishing marginal returns for announcing reme-
dies. In a system where every remedy is case-specific, there may be a
huge informational effect for the first announced remedy. It is the
remedial equivalent of the very first billboard on a highway. But if a
legal system has tens of thousands of rules governing the public, and
thousands of these have announced remedies, announcing one more
remedy will have little effect (either as communication or as precom-
mitment). Because the effect of announcing is lessened with each
new announced remedy, lawmakers should think carefully about
which remedies to announce. They should, in other words, pluck the
low-hanging fruit.
2. Announcing as a Reset
For the violations already discussed, such as unauthorized bank
disclosures to the government, it makes sense to establish an an-
nounced remedy and maintain it over time. But it is worth noting
that there are rare circumstances in which the ideal strategy might be
a temporary use of announcing. Assume that for a given legal rule, in
the long run it will be better to determine the remedy case by case,
though this is a fairly close question. But also assume that at present
157 See id. at 4.
158 The foundational work on system effects is JERVIS, supra note 80, at 147-49. For
application to legal analysis, see Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term-Foreword:
System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARv. L. REv. 4 (2009). Vermeule offers this defini-
tion: "A system effect arises when the properties of an aggregate differ from the properties of
its members, taken one by one." Id. at 6.
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there is little public agreement about what the remedy is likely to be
for a violation,1 59 and there is severe inequality at the remedy stage,
with remedies varying dramatically based on the race, gender, or
other personal characteristics of the wrongdoer and the victim. In
these circumstances it might make sense to shift to announcing in the
short run, as a way of resetting public expectations about remedies for
this particular rule-making those expectations more uniform across
the public and reducing invidious disparities. After this reset, there
could be a more enduring switch back to deciding the remedy case by
case. 160
This use of announcing should be relatively rare; the benefits will
rarely outweigh the disruption of shifting back and forth. And this
kind of reset is practical only for announcing as communication. For
the other two functions, there would be no lasting effects from having
previously announced the remedy.
3. The Hierarchy of Violations and Remedies
Another system effect is important and subtle. People often
think about violations in relative, hierarchical terms. This legal viola-
tion is worse than that one, but not as bad as some other one. And
scholars in many different areas, including punitive damages, pain-
and-suffering damages, and criminal penalties, have found a degree of
agreement among the public, or among experimental subjects, about
how to do this ordinal ranking of different legal violations. 16 1
When remedies are decided case by case, people are likely to
change their perception of the relative severity of different violations
slowly. As discussed above, when unsophisticated actors try to learn
about remedies, they face high information costs. 162 This means it is
harder for a person to know that her view about the relative serious-
ness of a legal violation is out of line. Thus, whatever views a person
has are likely to persist over time. But when a legal system announces
a remedy, there may be sudden changes in this perceived hierarchy of
159 See supra Part III.A.2.
160 Announcing as a reset is the inverse of the "tailoring experiment" described in Part
III.A.1, where announcing is used in the long run to save administrative costs, but case-by-
case decision making is used in the short run to help set the quantum of the announced
remedy.
161 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage, Erratic Awards, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
How JURIES DECIDE 31, 34-36 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002); Paul H. Robinson &
Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions ofJustice, 91 MINN. L. REv. 1829, 1832
(2007); Sunstein et al., supra note 30, at 2077-78, 2097-2100 (finding strong correlations
in experimental subjects'judgments about outrage and punitive intent when those subjects
were given descriptions of products liability cases). This agreement breaks down when
these ordinal rankings must be translated into cardinal numbers. See Sunstein et al., supra
note 30, at 2100-07.
162 See supra Part III.A.2.
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violations and remedies. Some people who previously did not have a
very clear idea of what the remedy would be, or who had a mistaken
idea, will now know exactly what the remedy is for a violation. And
this can change what someone thinks about the remedies for other
legal rules.
For some people, announcing can produce a change in the hier-
archy of remedies that is local. Imagine a person who sees the Manhat-
tan sign and says, "I didn't know honking a car horn in Manhattan was
so serious. It's a really big deal." The rest of this person's hierarchy of
remedies stays in place, but one particular violation-the honking of a
car horn on a residential street-suddenly moves up the hierarchy.
But for other people, announcing can produce a change in the
hierarchy of remedies that is global. Imagine a person who sees the
Manhattan sign and says, "If that's the fine for honking a car horn,
just think what the fine would be for double parking!" For this per-
son, the particular violation (honking a car horn on a residential
street) stays in its place in the hierarchy, but the entire hierarchy-or
at least some part of it, such as "violations related to cars"-might sud-
denly be perceived differently.
It is an empirical question whether announced remedies will have
a local or a global change on a person's hierarchy of violations and
remedies. The answer will probably vary from place to place and from
rule to rule. Yet it matters for the design of an announced remedy,
for either a local or global response could be useful.
Assume, for instance, that people are more likely to respond glob-
ally. Then perhaps a legal system could announce the remedy for one
violation and suddenly reap the benefits from people taking more se-
riously (or less seriously as the case may be) a host of related viola-
tions. Here, legal decision makers could counteract the diminishing-
marginal-return problem of announcing: to get a great deal of value
from announcing, a legal system might need to announce only a small
number of remedies. Announcing only one or two "focal remedies"
within a certain domain of substantive rules (such as the rules gov-
erning the conduct of drivers, accountants, or bloggers) could shape
perceptions of what other remedies are likely to be in the domain.
Or assume that people respond to announcing by making only
local changes in their hierarchy of violations and remedies. Then
remedies could be announced with less concern about the unin-
tended consequences of how announcing a remedy will affect public
perception of many other remedies. (Each alternative poses not only
an opportunity but also a danger. For instance, if people respond
globally, there is more risk of unintended consequences from
announcing.)
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In short, remedies function as a system, and the decision to an-
nounce the remedy for one legal rule is related to the same decision
about other legal rules.
D. Intermediate Approaches
The analysis so far has treated remedies in binary fashion. They
are, or are not, announced. As noted in Part I, however, the choice is
not always so sharp. Intermediate or mixed approaches of several
kinds are considered here: (1) announcing a range and then, within
that range, determining the remedy case by case; (2) announcing the
remedy that will be exacted from violators of a legal rule but tailoring
the remedy that is given to victims; and (3) determining the remedy
case by case but publicizing the median or most recent remedy. 163 All
of these intermediate approaches show the value of considering the
different functions of announcing.
1. Announcing a Range and Tailoring Within It
In the last several decades, many scholars have criticized the in-
consistency and arbitrariness of damage awards for noneconomic inju-
ries, such as pain and suffering. 164 One suggestion that is often made
is to schedule damages more or less in the manner of the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Guidelines.165 In general, the idea is that for a particular kind of
injury or tort there should be a range of possible damage awards, and
then within that range the jury should have discretion to choose the
163 These are the most common or attractive intermediate approaches, but others are
possible. For example, legal decision makers could announce a cap on damage awards
and then decide the remedy case by case beneath that cap. But see Avraham, supra note 35,
at 97-101 (criticizing caps). Or legal decision makers could announce a remedy as a for-
mal matter but in actual practice determine remedies case by case. But if the public learns
what the announced remedy is-which is, after all, usually the point-then people will
inevitably see the discrepancy between the announced remedy and actual practice. None
of the social benefits of announcing would then be achieved, and in particular there would
be heightened cynicism about whether legal decision makers are fairly enforcing the rules
of the game, thus undermining quasi-voluntary compliance. See supra Part II.B.
164 For a nuanced review of this literature, see Avraham, supra note 35, at 90-97.
165 See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 1, at 925, 975 (proposing the scheduling of
noneconomic damages, assuaging concerns about rigidity with the optional use of a range
instead of a mandatory point or with a separate administrative process for outliers, and
noting the analogy to criminal sentencing); Sunstein et al., supra note 30, at 2122 ("In the
criminal law.., the determination is made by the judge subject to the Sentencing Guide-
lines. Why would not the same approach make sense for punitive awards?"); Wistrich et al.,
supra note 39, 1328-29 (suggesting advisory guidelines, especially for damages that are
"inherently difficult to quantify"); Levin, supra note 29, at 303-04 (arguing for pain-and-
suffering guidelines modeled on state criminal sentencing guidelines); see also Ronald J.
Allen et al., An External Perspective on the Nature of Noneconomic Compensatory Damages and
Their Regulation, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1249, 1257, 1275 (2007) (advocating legislative sched-
ules, either exact amounts or ranges, which would be "modeled, in part, after sentencing
guidelines used in the states").
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award that best fits the facts. 166 In the terms of this Article, what these
scholars are suggesting is not announcing but rather an intermediate
approach. Legal decision makers would first "announce" a range, and
then within that range the remedy would be determined case by
case. 
167
The usefulness of this intermediate scheduling approach de-
pends on which function announcing is supposed to have. If an-
nouncing is meant to save administrative costs, then this approach
would be unwise. After all, administrative costs would increase be-
cause there would be both the costs of determining the appropriate
range and the costs of making case-by-case decisions.
Nor is this approach useful for announcing as precommitment.
Only the bottom of the range would likely matter. Although legal de-
cision makers may at time 1 specify a range with a very high upper
bound, they will not likely give such a remedy at time 2 when faced
with an actual case. This will be discovered by sophisticated repeat
players-exactly the audience for whom the precommitment function
is meant to work. 168
For the communication function of announcing, it is a closer
question. One problem would be solved: potential violators would not
be able to expect that the remedy exacted from them would be below
the announced range. But recall the situations in which the commu-
nication function is useful-situations in which unsophisticated po-
tential violators have difficulty learning about remedies and seriously
underestimate what they will be. In such circumstances, the potential
violators would still face high information costs in predicting where
the remedy would fall within the range. There would be an inevitable
loss of precision in the cases that are true outliers. And another loss
of precision might come from how the range itself could bias jury de-
166 Bob Rabin, who does not advocate such an approach, has described the
"[s]cheduling of damage awards" as the creation of "profiles of harm, crystallized into dis-
crete categories of specified awards with upper and lower limits, ranked according to severity
of physical injury." Rabin, supra note 31, at 376 (emphasis added).
167 That this approach is an intermediate one is not widely appreciated. Scholars
often describe the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES as if they were an instance of what this
Article calls "announcing" instead of an intermediate approach. See, e.g., Spier, supra note
2, at 85 n.3; Sunstein et al., supra note 30, at 2125. On announcing and the criminal law,
see infra note 171.
168 This is not to say a range will thwart an otherwise effective precommitment. The
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, described above, contemplates a range of statu-
tory damages from $100 to $1000. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text. But the
remedy works because the conditions are right for precommitment and the bottom num-
ber is sufficiently high (when claims are aggregated in a class action). That there is a range
is irrelevant.
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cision making through anchoring effects. 169 Still, this intermediate
approach may be useful if the value of retaining a little flexibility out-
weighs these disadvantages.
2. Announcing for Violators, Tailoring for Victims
Another intermediate approach would be for legal decision mak-
ers to bifurcate the remedy they take and the remedy they give. The
remedy could be announced vis-a-vis potential violators. Then these
fixed amounts could be collected into a compensation fund.
Amounts tailored to particular victims could then be paid out of that
fund. For instance, if this approach were to be used for defamatory
blog posts, then there would be an announced remedy that the blog-
ger would have to pay into the compensation fund (e.g., $50,000), but
the amount paid out to a victim would vary with the facts of the partic-
ular case.1 
70
This is an elegant and appealing solution, because it plays to the
strength of each approach. Legal decision makers get the remedial
communication of announcing without giving up the remedial preci-
sion of deciding on compensation one case at a time. It is therefore
of more use than the intermediate scheduling approach.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind certain limitations.
First, this approach would entail greater administrative costs than us-
ing either of the "pure" approaches. It would therefore be inappro-
priate if the function of announcing were cost saving.
Second, because the public's attention is finite, the announced
remedy would still have diminishing returns, so it would hardly be
efficient to adopt this approach universally.
Third, this approach would not fully secure any of the social ben-
efits of announcing. There would be a formal equality in what viola-
tors pay into the compensation fund, but what a person receives from
the fund could be affected by retail-level bias, and this might foster a
169 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damage
Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 391, 422-28 (2005). Alternatively, on using advisory damage sched-
ules as more accurate anchors, see Wistrich et al., supra note 39, at 1328-29.
170 This kind of decoupling of deterrence and compensation has been considered in
the tort theory and optimal deterrence literatures and is controversial. See, e.g., Martin
Stone, On the Idea of Private Law, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 235, 238-39 & 239 n.18
(1996) (criticizing such decoupling); see also Nuno Garoupa & Chris William Sanchirico,
Decoupling as Transactions Tax, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 469 (2010) (discussing the effect of this
decoupling on the primary activity). As a threshold matter, how receptive one is to such
decoupling will depend on whether one accepts the broad definition of "remedy" em-
ployed in this Article, see supra note 12 and accompanying text, or instead insists that a
remedy must be a remedying, a restoring of particular persons to their rightful position. An
insightful account of the rise of this latter, more particularistic conception of remedies in
tort law can be found in Goldberg, supra note 32, at 447-62; cf Issacharoff & Witt, supra
note 15, at 1573-77 (offering an account of aggregate-settlement devices that questions the
individualistic conception of tort remedies).
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perception of unequal treatment. And victims would still incur the
costs of telling. In essence, this hybrid starts with case-by-case decision
making about remedies and then pays some additional administrative
costs, either for the purpose of sharply reducing information costs for
potential violators or for the purpose of allowing legal decision mak-
ers to credibly commit to a high sanction. It can therefore be a useful
way of achieving two of the functions of announcing.
3. Tailoring and Publicizing the Remedy
A variation on the preceding intermediate approach would edge
even closer toward case-by-case decision making. The remedy that is
extracted and paid would be determined one case at a time, just as
most remedies in the United States currently are. But there would be
a serious effort to communicate something about the remedy to the
public-what is communicated might be the median remedy, for ex-
ample, or the most recent remedy.
Imagine that there were electronic signs on the desks of account-
ants indicating in real time what the most recent civil penalty was for
publication of falsified financial statements. Or imagine that blogging
platforms (e.g., WordPress) were required to display to new bloggers
in a clearly visible way the median damage award for a defamatory
post in the United States.
There would be many downsides: the cost of publicizing the rem-
edy, the risk of distraction and overdeterrence, no achievement of the
social benefits of announcing, no credible precommitment to give a
high sanction. And yet this intermediate approach might still work.
In effect, it starts with tailored remedies and then accepts some addi-
tional administrative costs in order to reduce information costs. If the
relevant public is seriously underestimating the remedy, this kind of
soft bifurcation might be useful.
E. Summary
Announcing is not a single phenomenon but rather a collection
of different strategies or functions. Where awarding remedies case by
case is not worth the administrative costs, announcing can perform a
cost-saving function. Where unsophisticated potential violators seri-
ously underestimate the remedies that courts are awarding, announc-
ing can perform a communication function. And where potential
violators are sophisticated actors, and legal decision makers know the
socially optimal conduct but not the external costs of deviation, an-
nouncing can perform a precommitment function.
Announcing can generate important social benefits. In addition
to reducing administrative costs, it can increase equality and compli-
ance, and it can reduce the costs of telling. Yet it is subject to impor-
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tant constraints. Its suitability depends on how the legal-violation
space is carved up among different legal rules or causes of action.
And it is vulnerable to changes in culture, technology, and the real
value of money. In short, it is powerful, if kept within bounds.
For normative theory and legislative design, the central question
is which function announcing is meant to perform. From the answer
to this question flows almost every other part of the analysis: quantum
of remedy, audience, situation, social benefits, constraints, system ef-
fects, and intermediate approaches. The following chart summarizes
the characteristics of each function:
TABLE: FUNCTIONS OF ANNOUNCING
COST-SAVING COMMUNICATION PRECOMMITMENT
Which
aspects of Aggregation Aggregation Aggregation
announcing and publication and publication
matter?
How large is Roughly equals Roughly equals Larger than
the remedy? remedy determined remedy determined remedy determined
case by case case by case case by case
Who is the
audience? Anyone Unsophisticated Sophisticated
Is this useful Yes, though Yes,for sanctions No Ys huhYs
situations? not exclusively exclusively
Which social Equality, Equality,
benefits are Equality compliance, compliance, possibly
achieved? costs of telling costs of telling
Which Interplay of rights
constraints Interplay of rights Interplay of rights and remedies
are mos and remedies, and remedies, (especially choice of
relevant? future proofing future proofing rule or standard),future proofing
Which sys- Diminishing Diminishing
tem effects None returns, resets, returns
matter? global responses
Which Announcing ranges,
intermediate None announcing only for Announcing
approaches violators, tailoring only for violators
can work? and publicizing
This theory of announcing is inevitably incomplete. Empirical in-
puts will always be needed. For example, does the public underesti-
mate the remedy? Because these inputs will vary over time, a legal
system cannot make a once-and-for-all decision about whether to an-
nounce a remedy. The decision will also be shaped by the aspirations
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and institutions of specific areas of law.' 71 And it cannot be made in
isolation, for it is affected by whether the remedies for other legal
rules are announced. For these reasons, the normative analysis of-
fered here is not meant to determine how the announcing decision
should come out for every remedy. Rather, it is meant to give scholars
and legal decision makers a set of organizing principles for thinking
through this decision.
If a legal system frequently alternated between announced and
case-by-case remedies with respect to a given substantive rule, or if it
frequently changed what the announced remedy was, it would be un-
dermining many of the reasons to announce in the first place. Fre-
quent alternation would impose new administrative costs. It would
also increase information costs because it would be hard for the pub-
lic to keep up with what the remedy was at any particular moment.
And frequent alternation would hardly foster the perception of equal
treatment: imagine that at times 1, 3, and 5 the remedies were de-
cided case by case, but at times 2, 4, and 6 the remedies were an-
nounced. Thus announcing requires some stability to be
advantageous.
What is needed is both a measure of stability and creative experi-
mentation with announcing. In Plato's Laws, the Athenian Stranger
compares the succession of lawmakers in a polity to a painter who
"never seems to finish working on each of the figures, but keeps
touching up or highlighting," without ever "reach [ing] a point where
there can be no further improvement of the paintings as regards
beauty and clarity." 17 2 And yet the Athenian Stranger recognizes the
virtue of stability, advising lawmakers to "learn[ ] from yearly practice"
and make "corrective changes," but only "until what seems to be a
satisfactory definition of such customs and practices has been
reached."173 This length of time, the Athenian Stranger cheerfully
171 An extreme example is criminal law, which is why this Article focuses on civil reme-
dies. In the criminal context there are special reasons to announce: liberty is at stake;
overdeterrence is unlikely; and remedial precision will always be elusive because the sen-
tence reflects unquantifiable harms to the social order and is never just a tallying up of
pecuniary harm to the victim. And there are special reasons to value the precision of case-
by-case decision making: criminal penalties are severe, difficult to insure against, and im-
posed at a great cost to society. But the main obstacle to effective announcing in American
criminal law is institutional. See generally Samuel L. Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. Rv.
1172, 1187-89 (2010) (arguing that use of power rules in U.S. law increases prosecutorial
discretion);James Q. Whitman, Equality in Criminal Law: The Two Divergent Western Roads, I
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 119, 153-55, 159-60 (2009) (critiquing institutional problems of the
American criminal-law system). Because prosecutors in the United States routinely have
discretion to charge a defendant with one or more of a broad array of offenses, announc-
ing the penalty for any one offense would not lead to greater equality, a greater perception
of equality, or reduced costs of telling.
172 PLATO, supra note 71, bk. VI, 769a-b, at 156.
173 Id. at bk. VI, 772b, at 159-60.
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says, will be about ten years. 174 The length of time is utopian, but the
prescription for the lawmaker is not. It is appropriate for legal deci-
sion makers to be modest and incremental, given their institutional
and epistemic constraints. But new approaches are needed, and ex-
perimentation in the art of remedies is overdue.
CONCLUSION
The determination of remedies case by case has implications that
have not been fully understood. Deterrence can be undermined
when the public, unable to predict the remedy, seriously underesti-
mates what it will be. Justice is more elusive when jury awards depend
on the race, gender, or physical attractiveness of the parties. Compli-
ance with the law is diminished when remedies seem to be dispensed
unequally. And hedonic adaption is difficult when what you get from
a court depends on how vividly you tell your story.
These realities are not wholly inevitable, for they depend in part
on the decisions a legal system makes about announcing. Through
judicious adoption of announced remedies, a legal system can achieve
a greater measure of both efficiency and justice. In furthering these
aims, announcing does not require heroic assumptions about legal de-
cision makers or the public. Instead, it accepts, and even exploits, the
bounded knowledge and weakness of will that characterize all human
beings. It is a perfect fit for an imperfect legal system.
174 See id.
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